

Craig Murray - Murder In Samarkand

Supporting Documents

"In publishing "Murder in Samarkand" I had wanted to publish the supporting documentation in the book to corroborate my story, especially as the FCO is claiming that the story is essentially untrue. In that sense, perhaps the most interesting link in the documents below is the very first document, which is a table of detailed amendments the FCO insisted be made to the text. This is fascinating if you consider just how much it confirms was true, particularly in the conversations it refers to between officials.

Many of the other documents I managed to have released under the Freedom of Information Act or Data Protection Act. I was astonished when the FCO announced that they would still take legal action against me if I published them. They argue that – and this astonished me – even if a document is released under the DPA or FoIA, it is still copyright of the Crown and so cannot be published. I was even more amazed when the lawyers of the publisher said that this was probably true, and certainly could not be fought without potentially a million pound legal case.

It appears that, among so many attacks on civil liberties in recent years, the Blair government has managed to administratively negate its own Freedom of Information Act. Robin Cook must be spinning in his grave.

Net posting is not breaching copyright because there is no charge to access the documents. I would be grateful if those who can mirror these documents on their own sites do so.

These are contemporary documents from my time as Ambassador in Uzbekistan. They do I believe include the real smoking gun on Britain's, and the CIA's, use of intelligence obtained by torture abroad. They also show the FCO getting increasingly angry with me over my being "over-focussed on human rights", rather than building good relationships with Karimov, our ally in the War on Terror.

They do not give a smoking gun that proves that the allegations brought against me, of which I was eventually cleared, were trumped-up and motivated by a desire to get rid of me for policy reasons. Being internal FCO documents, they are written to maintain the facade of a proper disciplinary investigation. You need to be prepared to read between the lines – and read the book!

Craig"

There was going to be a film made about this but to-date we have a radio play which you can listen to [here](#).

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The British Government acknowledged the authenticity of these documents which are presented for the first time together as one document.

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Document 1 – FCO Comment

This document details feedback from the FCO requesting changes to the book in its draft form.

Document 2 – IMF Telegram

This is the original draft of the telegram which I sent on the IMF and economic policy. The computer in my office could not link to our communications equipment, so after I drafted it on my word processor, Jackie or Karen had to type it again into comms. While they were doing this, inspiration struck and I went down and added to the end of the telegram by hand.

Document 3 – Declaration

I had been in Uzbekistan exactly four weeks when I became convinced that Western policy in Central Asia was completely ill-conceived. This telegram was my first major declaration of my view to London, where it came as a nasty shock.

Document 4 – Speech

The Head of Eastern Department, Simon Butt, and the Head of the Diplomatic Service, Sir Michael Jay KCMG, were horrified by my questioning of US foreign policy and by my proposal to make a strong speech on human rights in Uzbekistan. This was not Sir Michael Jay's view of diplomacy at all. In fact it is worth noting that, if you replace the word "Diplomacy" with "Duplicity" in Michael Jay's email, it still makes perfect sense.

Document 5 – Hill Negotiation

My proposal to make a strong speech on Uzbek Human Rights at Freedom House was strongly opposed by Sir Michael Jay and Simon Butt. Charles Hill of Eastern Department had the job of negotiating the text with me and, after this pretty sharp correspondence, I largely got the speech I wanted.

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Document 6 – Michael Wood memo of 13 March

After my protests at our obtaining intelligence under torture, I was astonished to be called back to London for a meeting on 8 March 2003 at which I was told that torture intelligence was legal, and that Jack Straw and Sir Richard Dearlove, Head of MI6, had decided that in the “War on Terror” we should, as a matter of policy, obtain intelligence got by torture by foreign intelligence services.

At the meeting it was agreed that Sir Michael Wood, the Foreign Office’s chief legal adviser, would put in writing his view that we were committing no offence by obtaining torture intelligence. This minute is that legal assurance.

Document 7 – Telegram of 18 March 2003 headed US Foreign Policy

I was horrified when the massive assault on Iraq started. I knew both that Iraq did not really possess WMDs, and that our weapons were much less precise than the news propaganda claimed; tens of thousands of civilians were dying.

Given that we were supporting the dictator Karimov, I thought it was pretty rich to be claiming to attack Hussein because he was a dictator. I was then outraged to see on BBC World TV a speech by George Bush saying we were going to war in Iraq to dismantle Hussein’s torture apparatus. I had just been informed that torture material was legitimate in the War on Terror.

I therefore sent the following telegram. This was the only protest from any British Ambassador at our entering on an illegal war, abandoning the UN Security Council, and following blindly George Bush’s violent and acquisitive foreign policy.

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Document 8 – letter from Simon Butt dated 16 April 2003

Following my telegram on the start of the Iraq war, Simon Butt, Head of Eastern Department, was sent out from London to tell me I was now considered “Unpatriotic”. On return he met with Sir Michael Jay (PUS), to discuss how to deal with me. His letter records this conversation.

Apart from the underlying political context, there are two astonishing things about this letter. The first is the libel by a government department of the anti-war Labour MP Andrew Mackinlay, who to the best of my knowledge had never been in a strip club, in Poland or anywhere else.

The second is that he notes that after dinner I went out with a young lady to a jazz club (which I did – it was my secretary Kristina, and we just went for a quick drink). But while he blows that up with much innuendo, he fails to note something much more significant.

While we were having dinner, the grandson of our host, Professor Mirsaidov, a distinguished dissident, had been abducted from outside the house by Uzbek security services. He had been tortured to death and his body dumped back on the family doorstep at 4am. It had been intended as a warning to dissidents and the British Embassy not to meet each other.

Simon Butt was fully aware of these facts when he wrote this letter, but plainly the murder of our host’s grandson – which was inconvenient for our important relationship in the War on Terror with Karimov – was much less worth mentioning than my going for a drink to a jazz bar.

Document 9 – Exchange of emails with Linda Duffield

With the Iraq war in full swing, I found myself marked down as not sound on the War and Terror and simply “sent to Coventry” by my London management, as I complained in this exchange of emails with Linda Duffield. This proved to be the calm before the storm.

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Document 10 – Colin Reynolds’ report of 26 June 2003

We lost our political officer when he cracked up under the pressure and started attacking people in the street. His partner, my deputy, also left. That was all of my British political and economic resource gone.

Personnel Department sent out an officer, Colin Reynolds, ostensibly on a pastoral visit following these events. In fact he had been primed by the Foreign Office to look for excuses to remove me, and briefed on rumours originated by the US Embassy that I was an alcoholic and I kept a “Love-nest” in Tashkent – both completely untrue.

In fact Reynolds’ report was very fair. His comments that some procedures were not followed correctly were accurate – he does not note my response, that the tiny staff of our Embassy in Tashkent was not equipped to carry out the full FCO bureaucratic requirements.

Document 11 – Minute of my meeting with Howard Drake

I was delighted to get away on holiday to Canada with my family after an exhausting and difficult year. The personnel officer, Colin Reynolds having failed to bring back the answer they wanted, while I was on leave the FCO sent a political officer, Dominic Schroeder, to Tashkent. The excuse was a “Crisis” they had themselves produced by suspending my five most senior members of office staff.

Schroeder came back and dutifully reported he had found allegations of mismanagement, alcoholism, financial corruption and offering sex in exchange from visas.

I was summoned back immediately from holiday and arrived back to meet Howard Drake of Personnel Department. I went straight from the airport to his office after a 16 hour overnight flight from Vancouver via Chicago, having not slept for 60 hours. As I walked in the door I had no idea I was about to face a huge raft of false allegations and be asked to resign.

In the circumstances I am amazed by how well I managed to defend myself at this meeting! You should bear in mind that this is Howard Drake’s record of this meeting; it therefore puts the best possible gloss on what the FCO was doing.

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Document 12 – Letter from British Businessmen in Tashkent

The British community in Tashkent were astonished to find their Ambassador was under attack.

Document 13 – Email to Kate Smith

It became plain to me that I had no hope of a fair investigation of the allegations against me. In particular I would not be allowed to call defence witnesses; indeed I was not allowed to tell anyone of the existence of the allegations. I was also banned from entering my own Embassy, and confined to my house in Tashkent.

It became too much for me, and I sent this email back from Tashkent to my union representative, Kate Smith, just before leaving to go into psychiatric care for depression. I am surprised by how articulate and clear-minded my email was.

Document 14 – Minute of 26 September 2003

I received many documents through an application under the Data Protection Act. These have been edited by the Foreign Office, with areas blacked out in the “interests of national security”.

This is an interesting example. This minute of 26 September 2003 is addressed to Sir Michael Jay (PS/PUS) and Jack Straw (PS). By convention minutes are addressed to the Private Secretary (PS) not the Secretary of State direct.

Among the things deleted for reasons of national security is who the minute was copied to. The copy addressees would be at the top right hand corner under the date. A friend of mine in Jack Straw’s office (remember I worked in the FCO for 21 years) tells me that the copy addressees on this and scores of other documents about me going through Jack Straw’s office, included 10 Downing Street, MI6 and the MOD. That is why they have been deleted. As detailed in the book, the instruction to get rid of me had come to the FCO from No 10 on the instigation of the Americans.

It is fascinating to consider what else the FCO felt it necessary to blank out in this minute.

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Document 15 – Telegram

I continued to refuse to resign and in the end was found not guilty of all the allegations against me, but given a formal warning for not having kept the allegations secret. Following a parliamentary and media campaign in my favour, I returned as Ambassador to Tashkent.

In July 2004, following the Abu Ghraib revelations, I yet again went back to argue with London that we should not be receiving intelligence from the Uzbek torture chambers. We were, I said, “Selling our souls for dross”. This telegram was leaked to the Financial Times, leading the FCO to tell the Uzbek government (before they told me) that I had been withdrawn as British Ambassador to Tashkent.

PAGE	EXTRACT	COMMENT
1	SIS	
254	<p>Numerical codes showed me that this was CIA material, sourced from the Uzbek SNB, which the CIA shared with MI6, who issued it to customers such as British Ministers, Eastern Department and me. I now saw two items which seemed to sum up my concerns about these intelligence reports. The first claimed that Islamic militants were gathered in camps in the Tajik hills just above Samarkand, ready to swoop upon the city. I discussed this with Nick Ridout, and we agreed it was nonsense – there were no such camps. The second piece of intelligence purported to give information that certain Uzbek dissidents were linked to Al Qaida, and had travelled to Uzbekistan to meet Osama bin Laden</p>	Request removal. Purports to disclose the contents of intelligence reports. Disclosure undermines trust maintained with intelligence sources and could therefore impair operational effectiveness.
2	GCHQ	
513-514	<p>There was further, and extremely strong, evidence that this was not the Islamic terrorist attack the authorities wished us to believe. It came from intelligence material. We had communications intercepts of the senior leadership of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and of Al Qaida, based variously in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. The airwaves were fairly humming with their traffic. They were all phoning each other up, and what they were saying precisely is “Does anyone know what the Hell is happening in Tashkent?” None of them did know.</p> <p>This was very inconvenient for the Americans, who desperately wanted it to be Al Qaida. The timing could not have been more convenient – a fact that is worth bearing in mind. Two weeks later Colin Powell was due to certify to</p>	Request removal. Revelations of actual or implied intelligence capability are damaging to the national interest.

Congress that Uzbekistan was making progress on human rights and democracy, a certification necessary for certain aid payments. In 2003 Powell had signed off such a certification, which must have been the most duplicitous document issued by the US government since their treaties with the Red Indians. Plainly Uzbekistan was in fact making no progress at all, and an attack by Al Qaida just at this time would divert attention from this. But here was this very concrete evidence from intelligence that neither Al Qaida, nor the IMU, had any part in the planning but were desperately trying to work out what was going on.

The US response to this difficulty was to interpret it away. One record of a telephone call between two senior IMU figures had one asking if the other knew what was happening, and the other replying that he didn't know what was happening, but it seemed like some kind of "New Group" was behind the Tashkent bombings.

There was an incredible footnote to this intelligence report from the United States National Security Agency. It explained that when the IMU said it appeared to be the work of a "New group", it did not actually mean a new group. Rather the new group was women, and this was the first deployment by the IMU of female bombers. There was some additional explanation about translation from Russian of the term "New Group". The last struck me as particularly odd and I checked carefully – in fact the Russian words used were precisely analogous to "new group" in English.

3 US relations and confidential conversations

pp152-155

"But what are you talking about?" I replied, "The media is completely censored. There is absolutely no real news at all – it's the most arrant propaganda."
"Well, Craig, I don't know how extensive you're research has been. But we have a major media project, and there have been a couple of articles in the

Request removal or redrafting of conversation with John Herbst.

There would have been an expectation that this conversation took place in confidence and so there would be a risk to future cooperation

regional press which have been critical of the decisions of regional officials. And Ruslan Sharipov has published articles attacking government corruption” “That hardly affects the general picture – they sound like exceptions that prove the rule, from the very fact that you can list the only articles that aren’t government propaganda. But the human rights situation is desperate. Do you realise how many torture cases there are now documented?”

“If you are referring to the boiling case, I know you’re making a big thing of it too, and we are very concerned. But it is an isolated incident. I have never heard of a parallel case. And there has been a real advance on torture. In the Ferghana Valley, three policemen have been convicted of the murder of a detainee. That was after a case which I took up personally with Karimov. That is undoubtedly real progress. Previously officials have been completely immune from any fear of retribution. Nothing will do more to change the behaviour of the police and security services.”

“I still think that is a drop in the ocean. Human Rights Watch and other NGOs reckon there are some 7,000 prisoners of conscience, held for political and religious beliefs. I must say from my own research I am starting to think that is an underestimate.”

“Yes, but most of those are Muslims.”

“I’m sorry?”

“I mean Muslim extremists. Most of those prisoners are Muslim extremists. You know, Karimov has a genuine problem that you can’t ignore. He faced armed incursions from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. These bad guys really exist. They are not imaginary. You know, we are all caught up in the War on Terror. We didn’t want to be.

Nobody in the USA asked for the Twin Towers to be attacked. But we find ourselves defending our very lifestyle. And Karimov is part of that defence.”

“Yes, but all the evidence is that the vast majority of those in jail aren’t terrorists at all. I don’t think they are extremists. Even the ones convicted of membership of Hizb-ut-Tehrir mostly aren’t really members. The evidence is

and trust on this basis.

planted. Most of them are just in jail for following their religion. They aren't extremists."

"You don't think the Taliban were extreme?"

"Yes, I think the Taliban were extreme."

"Well, think about it. Most of these guys who were locked up, if they were in power they would impose the same kind of society. Have you ever been to Broadway? That's what they call the kind of recreational area here. I like to sit on Broadway and have a quiet beer, watching the pretty Uzbek girls go by in T shirts and skirts. You know, this society is Western in some ways. If these guys in jail got their way, you would have none of it.

No Broadway, no beer, no T shirts, certainly no mini skirts."

"Look, accepting for a moment that those in jail do want that – and I think that's open to doubt – if that's what they want, they are entitled to their view, as long as they don't turn to violence to try to achieve it. I don't call them extremists."

"Well, that's where we differ. A fully Islamic society, with Sharia law, is extremist. Extreme Islam is itself a kind of institutionalised violence. Do you realise how much women would be oppressed if the Islamists got into power? You know, I had six US congressmen visiting here this week. They were given a briefing on human rights by Mikhail Ardzinov of the Independent Human Rights Organisation of Uzbekistan. He told those congressmen, straight out, that most of these so called prisoners of conscience - not just most, the large majority he said, the large majority – ought to be in prison. Now here's another step forward, Ardzinov's organisation has been registered and is fully legal"

"I'm beginning to see why."

"That's really not fair. Ardzinov has a very brave record over many years."

"I look at this another way. People are being locked up because they are Muslim. So are other political dissidents, but most prisoners are locked up for being Islamic. There are no fair trials, and there is a lot of torture in the

	<p>prisons. We are being seen to support this regime, so we are making Muslims hate us. We are provoking terrorism, not fighting it.”</p> <p>John looked weary, as though he had heard this all before.</p> <p>“Look,” he said, “Karimov’s got to keep a tight grip on the Muslims. He also wants to drive forward a reform agenda, but he’s facing a lot of resistance from within the governing party. And his biggest problem is his own training. Karimov is a Soviet trained economist. The problem is he thinks he understands economics, but all he knows is a lot of false precepts. Karimov is the best Uzbek leader we’ll get, and he’s not personally corrupt.”</p>	
p513	<p>Colin Powell</p> <p>In fact Colin Powell was knowingly lying. He knew this was nothing to do with Al-Qaida. But was there actually an insurgency, or was the whole thing cooked up by the Americans and the Uzbeks? Had they gone so far as to plant a few small bombs and kill off a few policemen themselves? If I am losing your sympathy and you don’t believe such a thing is possible, I suggest you read Graham Greene’s <i>The Quiet American</i>, and acquaint yourself with the historical truths behind it.</p>	<p>Request removal.</p> <p>The allegation that "Colin Powell was knowingly lying",is potentially damaging to relations with the US.</p>
4	Research Analysts	
pp158-159	<p>In this period I received in my office a young analyst named X from the FCO’s Research Analysts. Y was the analyst who dealt specifically with Central Asia, and X was a colleague who shared a room with Y. He was researching regional security issues in the former Soviet Union. He was most</p>	<p>Request redraft.</p> <p>The portrayal of RA that they were involved in the drafting of the WMD dossier is not</p>

concerned about the threat of increasing Islamic militarism in Uzbekistan, feeding through into international terrorism.

I was relieved to find that X shared my analysis. He felt that the Karimov regime had no intention of adopting real reform, was completely beyond the pale on human rights, and was creating a tinderbox through harsh repression leading to resentment and reaction. He was the first to point out to me that the neo-conservatives in the Bush camp, particularly the so-called intellectuals of the religious right, were talking of a United States-Israel-Uzbek axis driving a military wedge into the heart of Islam – thinking picked up by Donald Rumsfeld in his “Lily pad” policy of air bases surrounding, in effect, the Muslim world.

X told me that Research Analysts despaired of our blind support for Bush in Central Asia, which had somehow been subsumed into the US notion of the “Wider Middle East”. Eastern Department held a radically different view from Research Analysts and were, driven by , blindly “Atlanticist” or pro-American. The policy of backing nasty dictators was bound to rebound on us – it always does - but they just couldn’t see it.

FCO Research Analysts have a key role in assimilating material from media, academic and other open sources, combining it with diplomatic reporting and intelligence material and then analysing and assessing it. To give an idea of their role, they lead in discussions between Whitehall and the United States National Security Council. They play an important role at the Joint Intelligence Committee and its sub-committees.

They would therefore have been central to the preparation of the dossier on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq. I had always found our Research Analysts to be very bright, with a strong reputation in the academic world and a lot of personal integrity. It was therefore beyond me how they had signed up, as they must have, to the dossier. I asked my visitor whether it was the rubbish it seemed or whether there was knockdown evidence I was unaware of. He said the dossier was indeed the rubbish it seemed. There were no Iraqi

true. It also suggests that they signed up to the WMD dossier knowing it was ‘rubbish’ and so compromised their honesty. This is a serious charge and untrue. In this case, the allegation is made generally against RAs and so is potentially damaging to any research analyst who worked there at the time.

Specific reference is made to X and Y. The comments about signing up to what they knew to be a false document is harmful to them specifically. We understand that the conversation with X never took place as described. He was not involved in the drafting of dossier and had no knowledge of either its preparation or its content at the time the conversation is alleged to have taken place.

There are suggestions that RA “lead” in discussions between Whitehall and the United States’ National Security Agency; and that RA play ‘an important role in the Joint Intelligence Committee and its sub-committees’. The first of these claims is untrue. While RA make a significant analytical contribution to JIC papers, they are not represented on the JIC, as the drafting could imply. This point has apparently been picked up by a Russian website (<http://www.iraq-war.ru/article/61866>). This

	<p>WMD. History has proven him right. I hadn't asked the next question, but it hung in the air between us. "You're wondering why we signed up to it?" he asked. "Well, I can promise you it was awful. The pressure was unbelievable. People were threatened with the end of their careers. I saw analysts in tears. We felt, as a group, absolutely shafted. Actually we still do. You know, I think we are all a bit ashamed that nobody had the guts to go public, resign and say that the WMD thing is a myth. But you know MI6 really hyped it. The DIS (Defence Intelligence Service) tried to block it but they couldn't."</p>	<p>picked up chapter ten, published on your website for a day in September. This has resulted in operational damage to RA. We have to assume that the security services of the CIS region (in particular, the Federal Security Service (FSB) in Russia) have read the chapter; they will not have failed to spot that a memoir by an ex-British Ambassador to an ex-Soviet country had appeared on the internet. The FSB, like the KGB before them, believe incorrectly that RA is the analytical arm of SIS. Our judgement is that the Russian and other FSU security services will almost certainly have read the manuscript as confirmation of their wholly inaccurate belief that RA are part of the UK intelligence services, with all that this is likely to entail for individuals careers, and the functioning of ERG, in the future</p>
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5 British Embassy Tashkent

<p>pp245-246</p>	<p>Locally Engaged Staff <u>X / Y</u></p> <p>An equally extraordinary problem hit me the next day. A had asked X the accountant, for a false declaration of salary for Y and himself. Families earning below a certain level – about 10% of their income – get free schooling, while X and A had to pay a small contribution, a very few dollars a month. X refused to issue a false certificate, and so they had produced one themselves, on Embassy paper.</p>	<p>Request redraft.</p> <p>Factual error - pages 245-246 the reference is to X . She was not involved in this episode – she was on leave; it was Y at the time.</p> <p>However, of much more concern are the numerous references to LE staff that might</p>
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brought me the news. She seemed triumphant rather than sad. and admitted it – arrogantly quiet and shame faced. I reluctantly agreed to Karen's assertion that this had to be a sacking offence.

C It is true no single note was produced, but the visit was mentioned in our telno 55 and elsewhere, and particularly in discussions with our OSCE and US colleagues. It resulted directly in a major success – the release of an innocent man from jail. C has been working on this case and can confirm this.

pp497-499

The second doubt, which I kept to myself, was that this did not sound like Richard. A gentle man, deeply interested in economic development, he was also a rather timid soul and absolutely the last person who would jet off to meet with an informant from the narcotics trade. He just wasn't that dynamic. The UN had multiple interests in the border at Termez, including the importance of the crossing for regional development and the flow of humanitarian aid, and indeed the UN, EU and the UK all had various counter-narcotics programmes involving this border. As titular head of the UN effort in Uzbekistan, Richard had visited the anti-narcotics project. But to become operationally involved? It just didn't sound like Richard at all.

I thanked my visitor, who left a long letter which he stressed was deeply secret and must not fall into the wrong hands. Once had translated this letter it turned out to say no more than he had told me on his visit, though in a much longer-winded and less direct way. The visitor promised that he would get back in touch with more evidence, but he never did.

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E The other girl I met was E She was short but extraordinarily beautiful and vivacious, with a perfect figure including the most wonderful neat bum. She always wore figure hugging jeans and T shirt. She seemed a fixture in the bar, sat there at the end of it, cigarette in hand, chatting to Yuri the barman. Yuri

cause difficulty for them in dealing with the local authorities. C is very worried and upset by the references to him, especially those dealing with HR defenders. X also has a similar issue when she is quoted on page 228 as saying 'things are now worse than they were in Soviet times'.

had long dark hair, wisps of beard and sported a red bandana. He affected a very cosmopolitan air, but had never left Tashkent.

E was extremely intelligent and very much her own woman. The first time – no, the first three or four times – I offered to buy her a drink, she turned me down flat. In the end I had to buy the whole bar a drink, in which she didn't object to participating. I thought and E were an item, but was most surprised when she introduced me one evening to her fiancé, . He was a fifty year old American, short and balding with a pot belly. He worked for a company called Premier Executive, who operated commercial flights in support of US operations in Uzbekistan. Two of his colleagues also drank in that bar: they were essentially ground crew. Their company ran small executive jets. This did not surprise me at all, as I could think of numerous ways that kind of logistic support would be needed by the large US presence in Uzbekistan, with its major construction projects at the new Embassy and K2 Airbase. I was surprised to learn that they sometimes flew Uzbek prisoners back to Tashkent from Baghram airbase in Afghanistan.

E was extremely feisty, and determined not to be impressed by my being an Ambassador. She came from a wealthy Uzbek family, and her father was a retired KGB colonel. E and I used to argue a lot about politics. She took me aback by saying that things in Uzbekistan had got much worse since Soviet times. I argued, saying that she was romanticising the Soviet Union. Communism had been an awful system, and the Soviet Union had collapsed simply because it didn't work.

Running of Embassy

In Tashkent, Christopher told me bluntly, he had no political support at all.

Even was not an actual second secretary, but an acting one.

He added that was a very good administrator, but that she and had an "ECO attitude". He meant that they had no interest in interacting with Uzbekistan,

Unwarranted detail about the operation of,

<div data-bbox="18 11 136 206">p81</div> <div data-bbox="18 378 136 493">p123</div> <div data-bbox="18 665 136 780">p168</div> <div data-bbox="18 895 136 1010">p241</div>	<div data-bbox="136 11 1173 206"> <p>or learning anything about its culture. They did not have Uzbek friends, or any deep knowledge of the country.</p> <p>Plainly there was some wider problem with and , but I would take them as I found them.</p> </div> <div data-bbox="136 378 1173 493"> <p>“Let me get this straight. You are telling me we only go around this country on Uzbek government transport and with Uzbek government escort. How the hell are we supposed to find out what’s really happening?”</p> <p>“Well, we don’t travel that often.”</p> <p>Plainly was getting very uncomfortable with this line of questioning, and I sensed it would not be productive to pursue the question of how much of the country she and had got round in the past.</p> </div> <div data-bbox="136 665 1173 780"> <p>Among the intriguing questions this opened up, was who interpreted for and , who didn’t even speak Russian, when they dealt outside official circles? The answer, of course, was that they didn’t interact outside a very narrow world.</p> </div> <div data-bbox="136 895 1173 1010"> <p>On the other hand, working relationships in the Embassy were poisonous. obviously hated and , while the relationships between UK and Uzbek staff were strained and formal. I had the impression the Uzbeks were treated with scant respect. This was a pity, because they were very good. Part of the trouble was the lack of the normal senior and middle level British staff in an Embassy. To put it at its most basic, Colonel Ridout and I were the only university graduates among the UK staff. The Uzbek staff were almost all graduates, even most of the guards. Relationships seemed to be ruled by mutual contempt.</p> </div> <div data-bbox="136 1044 1173 1130"> <p>Then I was astonished, the day before the Christmas party, to be approached in my office by and . The staff would not come to the party, they said, if and</p> </div>	<div data-bbox="1173 11 1801 1130"> <p>and allegations about, the effectiveness of the Embassy.</p> </div>
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p270	<p>did. It was as simple as that. I knew relationships were bad within the Embassy, but this was amazing.</p>	
6 Staff Member		
p289	<p>I had worked particularly closely on it with X. He had an enormous international reputation and was considered a shoo in for the position of Y and the accompanying knighthood. However when the US illegally attacked Libya in the Gulf of Sirte incident X refused to sign up to an argument that pre-emptive strike was legal, on the grounds that it wasn't. The Tory government was furious and this was the end of X's chances in the Foreign Office. Another , who was felt to be less encumbered by principle, became with capital letters, and .. Now he was retired from the FCO and I was pleased to see him on television being highly sceptical of the legality of the war on Iraq.</p> <p>The passing over of X had just occurred when I joined Z , then posted in New York, at an UN meeting on the reduction of the peacekeeping force in Cyprus, chaired by Kofi Annan, then in charge of peacekeeping. After work Z and I adjourned to a bar and commiserated on the appalling treatment of X.</p>	<p>Request deletion</p> <p>Unsubstantiated suggestion as to why X was not appointed Y. No evidence that these comments are true.</p>
7 Staff Member		
pp273-274	<p>I had two meetings in London while I was there. The first was with X , whose FCO title was . She was Y,s new boss and the woman who would countersign his staff reports on me X is a severe, dry woman with short grey</p>	<p>Request redraft to correct errors and misquotations.</p>

hair. I had arranged to call on her, and when I entered her office Y was there too. They both looked extremely severe and a heavy atmosphere hung in the room.

“Sit down, Craig”, she said. “Simon tells me that he has areas of concern about your performance and, from what I have seen, I must say I am concerned too.”

“OK. Nice to meet you, incidentally.”

This was ignored. Simon started up.

“I think our worry is that you are antagonising the Uzbeks to the stage where they will pay you no attention. You are also causing real damage to our relationship with Uzbekistan. I was most concerned, for example, that you told Komilov that every word of your Freedom House speech had been cleared with London.”

“Why not? It was.”

“You know that’s not the full story. You railroaded that speech through junior staff.”

“That’s simply untrue. I sent the draft to you and to . I even copied in Michael Jay on the correspondence. In fact I seem to recall you complained I was going over your head.”

X came to Simon’s rescue: “I want to make myself perfectly clear. Had I been in this position at the time, I would not have allowed you to make that speech.” Her head shook and she seemed to tremble with suppressed outrage: “No Ambassador should ever make such a speech. That is the job of politicians. Your job is to administer UK/Uzbek relations, not to undermine them. You seem to lack any sense of proportion. Human Rights is only one area of our work, and by no means the most important. You are neglecting your commercial duties. I understand there are management problems inside the

She did not say that your job was to ‘administer’ UK/Uzbek relations. She fully supported taking a tough line on human rights in accordance with agreed FCO policy. She did not say that she would not have allowed your Freedom House speech, but that she would probably not have approved it in the terms it was drafted. She did not say that you were neglecting your commercial duties, but that you needed to ensure your focus on one important issue, human rights, was not at the expense of other objectives in Uzbekistan. You also needed to act with others (eg EU and US colleagues) and not just unilaterally. She did not “flinch” from visiting Tashkent, but said that she very much wanted to, that Simon Butt as your Line Manager would go out first and she would go out afterwards. This visit sequence had been agreed with the PUS.

Embassy.”

Simon was smirking. I was really getting angry.

“I am sorry,” I said, “You are completely wrong on all points. I put much more effort into commercial work than into anything else, and we have transformed the performance of the Embassy in that regard. And we are not losing influence with the Uzbeks, we have more than ever before. Standing up to them is important – they take no notice of conventional diplomacy. I think you’ve been very badly briefed.” I looked at Simon. “Look, X, why don’t you come out and visit Tashkent and see for yourself”.

She flinched. “I have a very large area of responsibility, and because of you I am already spending more time on this than I can afford. We have decided that Simon will come out to visit shortly. He will report back to me.”

X went on: “The PUS wishes me to assure you that your concerns have been given full consideration at the highest level. He has discussed this with Jack Straw, and C has given his views. Both the FCO and MI6 have taken legal advice on the question that you have raised. Michael, could you outline the legal position?”

“We really do understand why you are upset. But we need to know that you are on message. Do you understand the position? You are a civil servant and I should not have to remind you that you act on behalf of the Secretary of State and in accordance with policy set by Ministers.”

p290

pp291-
292

8 Staff Member

p288

X , the link between the FCO and MI5, MI6 and other shadier organisations...

p291

“Good. Now Matthew, could you give the view of the Security Services?” X purred in “Certainly . The view of the security services is that this is high quality intelligence material and plays a very important role in the War on terror. It would be a major loss if we ceased to have access to it. It would also cause unprecedented practical problems for the US/UK intelligence sharing agreement, which we are anxious should not be disturbed”.

p541

“But it’s nonsense”, I interrupted. “The intelligence is crap. It exaggerates the strength of the IMU and is full of false information about so-called links to Bin Laden. It’s just stuff the Uzbeks want the Americans to believe so that they will continue to give the Karimov regime military, financial and political support.”

“On the contrary” X again, still more silken - “I can assure you, this has been considered at the very highest level, and there is no doubt that this is operationally useful material.”

“Thank you” said , herself still more clipped, “I think that clears this up. We needn’t detain you gentlemen. Could you stay a moment please, Craig”.

p543

On behalf of the intelligence services, X said that they found some of the material very useful indeed with a direct bearing on the war on terror. said that she had been asked to assure me that my qualms of conscience were respected and understood.

Request redraft. X is misquoted. He did not go further than saying that the material was operationally useful.

9 Staff Member

See p109, pp169-170, pp244-245, p352, pp360-361, pp380-381, p385, pp403-404. See also British Embassy Tashkent

Request redraft, including removal of any alleged quotations attributable to staff member in question

10 Staff Member

p467

X had been a young Second Secretary at the British High Commission in Nicosia, Cyprus, when I had been Head of Cyprus Section in London. One day I had received a phone call from Personnel Department to say that our High Commissioner in Cyprus had reported that X was useless and asked for him to be removed. Personnel Department were surprised because of X's previous good record. What was my view?"
I said we regarded X as a very good officer, with excellent contacts and a good eye for information, and whose reporting was regular, useful, thoughtful and balanced. On the other hand we had our doubts about the High Commissioner, who had just spent £60,000 (a lot of money in 1993) of Embassy money on embroidered curtains for his second Residence. This did the trick and X's career was saved from a potential damaging blip. X and I had a genuine mutual regard. I could talk to him easily.

Request deletion. Unsubstantiated from the file and a matter of concern to the staff member in question.

11 Staff Member

pp469-471

The next morning I phoned Medical Advisers again. Once more the secretaries would not confirm whether the clearances had been received, and said I would hear from Dr Thornton. No, he was in consultation at the moment and not available to speak. What time could I see him? He was busy all day. Could I make an appointment? No, not without his confirmation that it was necessary for him to see me.

Request redraft.

This is offensive, and is causing great distress. Although not named in the text, the individual considers that she is easily identifiable by the characteristics described and by the timing of

The secretary I was talking to had a thick Northern Irish accent. She had started by being defensive, but progressed to being brusque and outright rude. She was growling at me in a deep bass, in her harsh Ulster accent.

"Ok," I said, "I'll come in and see him."

"He is very busy. He doesn't have a spare appointment".

"That's OK. It'll only take a minute. I only need his confirmation he received the clearances".

"I cannot guarantee when he will be ready to see you".

"Don't worry, I'll bring a good book".

I did. I took Fitzroy Maclean's life of Bonnie Prince Charlie, which you should read if you haven't. Not the greatest psychological life, but wonderful on the Scottish clan, religious and political background, and above all a masterly exposition by someone with practical experience of guerrilla war.

I arrived at Medical Advisers about 11am, walking through Horseguards and across the unpleasant dusty deep gravel of Horseguards Parade (designed to absorb horseshit), into the back entrance of the Old Admiralty Building. Passing under the arch and immediately taking a side door to my left before the courtyard, I was in Medical and Welfare Department of the FCO. Down a half flight of stairs and into a cramped office to my right, there sat the Medical Advisers' secretaries. There were four of them, and the closest to the door was a large, blowsy woman with a florid complexion and lots of untidy hair. She looked slightly out of focus, like an old photo of one of Jack the Ripper's victims. It was no surprise that she was my Ulster angel.

"Hello, I'm Craig Murray", I said.

"Dr Thornton's busy".

"That's OK, I will wait in the waiting room, shall I? Can you let him know I

events.

Request deletion of references to Jack the Ripper.

am here?"

"He can't be interrupted."

"Well, let him know I'm here, when you can".

I climbed back up the half flight to the waiting room. It was a partitioned area about four feet wide and seven feet long. I settled into Fitzroy Maclean. At noon I decided to go down again, and speak with the secretary.

"I just thought I'd let you know I'm still here."

She ignored me studiously, and turned to one of her co-workers with a question about something else. I sat on the edge of her desk, and waited some five minutes until that conversation – which she was plainly dragging out – concluded. I picked up a file from her desk. I had no intention of looking at it, but it forced her to acknowledge my existence.

"Do you mind?" she said. "That is a confidential medical file."

I handed it back.

"Just checking", I said, "I was scared I was becoming invisible".

"Oh no, you're very visible, Mr Murray." she said, her voice thick with contempt.

"Good. Have you managed to tell Dr Thornton I'm here?"

"No. He's gone out."

"Really, when will he be back?"

"I don't know."

"It's OK, I'll wait." I said.

I went back to the waiting room, and returned to my book. I went back down at 12.45, and was told that no, he wasn't back yet. I went back at 1.45, and found the room locked; everyone was at lunch. At 2.30pm I went back again. This time I gave a cheery wave, just said, "I am still here" and went back.

This is the original draft of the telegram which I sent on the IMF and economic policy. The computer in my office could not link to our communications equipment, so after I drafted it on my word processor, Jackie or Karen had to type it again into comms. While they were doing this, inspiration struck and I went down and added to the end of the telegram by hand.

Craig Murray
May 2006.

Subject: IMF/Uzbekistan: A fake reform programme

Summary

1. IMF mission in town to assess progress on SMP following two month extension. The reform process is a sham. Crash Uzbek measures immediately before IMF arrival designed to impress not to stick. FDI has dried up and investors are voting with their feet. Gap between black market and official exchange rates not closing. US push for politically motivated IMF approval could have disastrous long term consequences for development and the region.

Detail

2. The IMF are currently visiting to assess Uzbek progress in the two months since they were given a second chance to meet the requirements of the SMP. They will find no progress at all on the key issue of currency convertibility. On the target of narrowing the gap between the black and official exchange rates to 20%, it had remained between 40 and 50% throughout the two month period until falling to around 25% in the last week due to a series of quite extraordinary measures.
3. Notoriously before the June IMF visit the Uzbeks flooded the bazaars with cash dollars to cause a temporary exchange rate blip. This time they have hit on the cheaper expedient of physically closing down the bazaars. On 1 September the largest bazaar and main source of imported goods, the Hippodrome, was summarily closed for "repairs". In the last week all the main bazaars selling imports have been shut down and hundreds of traders raided by the police to check documentation. If this is not in order (ie nearly all the time) the goods are confiscated plus the trader is fined in hard currency the value of the goods again.
4. Simultaneously an emergency import tax of an additional 30% was introduced on all except medical items, on top of existing tariffs of 50% on food and 90% on non-food goods. Not surprisingly these extreme measures to halt imports have reduced dollar demand short term and led to a fall in the black market rate; but no one doubts that they are unsustainable and highly temporary measures designed again to produce a temporary blip for the IMF visit. Uzbekistan's unreformed post-Soviet economy does not produce consumer goods for import substitution and a long term solution needs a devaluation and early abolition of the official rate, not an artificial strengthening of the Som on the black market.
5. The government claims to be moving towards currency convertibility by the end of this year, but it is unclear that it understands the concept. Certainly nobody in the dwindling business and financial community believes that you will be able to walk into a bank with som and walk out with dollars. Lack of convertibility and consequent inability to repatriate profits, together with bureaucracy stifling every transaction and pervasive corruption, have led to most smaller foreign investors giving up and quitting. Every single one of the Ambassadors on who I have paid courtesy calls has concurred that their resident business community has reduced in

the last five years, usually by well over 50%, with smaller investors bearing the brunt.

6. British American Tobacco are a good example of what can go wrong. Our 300 million euro showpiece investment, they have received negligible currency allocation to allow them to remit profits. In desperation they purchased a locally built Ilyushin 76 aircraft for some to literally fly some of their profits out – they planned to sell it outside the country, only to discover that no-one wants to buy an Uzbek Ilyushin for hard currency. They have also been let down by the Uzbek government which has broken promises on tax and prevention of smuggling.
7. Another 45 million euro British project, Sergily Building Materials, which included 10 million euro of EBRD financing, failed when the Uzbek government reneged on a contract to purchase much of the product. It reneged by the simple expedient of dissolving the parastatal which had signed the contract and reconstituting it with a new name. The EBRD is currently negotiating to let the Uzbek government have the 10 million euros of equipment supplied for a great deal less than it cost, on the grounds that the British venture having been bankrupted this is the only way for the EBRD to recoup some of its loan. This is, frankly, appalling. I hope it gets a mention at the EBRD Conference in Tashkent next spring.
8. Both BAT and Sergily suffer from not making corrupt payments, and not in particular involving members of President Karimov's family. Coca-Cola and Case New Holland, for example, are closely associated with the President's daughters and featured prominently on the list of those who had no difficulty getting and remitting dollars at the official rate, along with the trading companies connected with the Karimov oligarchy. Coca-Cola have recently fallen spectacularly from grace after the MD of the Uzbek franchisee divorced the President's daughter. In a deposition to an US custody court on 12 September the MD claimed that Coca-Cola and his other business interests in Uzbekistan were subsequently subject to constant government harassment – in fact they just joined the ordinary foreign investor in that position.
9. When I met the British Business Community it is fair to say that many regretted their investment. FDI has all but dried up except where there is offshore hard currency income (Oxus). The EBRD, for example, cannot find viable private sector partners and in 2001 92% of its lending was into the public sector. 48% of its overall portfolio is public sector, and the two largest schemes in its private sector portfolio have failed spectacularly.
10. One of the raft of reforms just passed for the IMF is the abolition of the list of companies who get priority foreign exchange allocation. But with a false exchange rate rationing will still happen – it will now be done by the commercial banks not the government, but the "commercial" banks are of course state-owned. EBRD who have had terrible problems using them as a conduit for SME finance because their lending decisions are corrupt and political, not commercial, so they will simply favour the oligarch firms who were on the "abolished" list. It is a pretence at reform.

11. The same is true of cotton. In another IMF prescribed measure President Karimov has announced that farmers may sell half their cotton privately and need only sell half to the state. But how meaningful is this when the farms themselves have not been privatised and the farmers are, in effect, serfs? I have been told by member firms of the Liverpool Cotton Association that the state purchasing body is preparing forms for farmers to sign "voluntarily" selling the other half of their cotton to the government.
12. The list of sham reform goes on. Import licensing will be abolished, but the correct import documentation has to be submitted and approved in advance. Not import licensing, of course.
13. In 20 years in power, 11 of it in charge of an independent country, Karimov has overseen extraordinarily little economic liberalisation and I see no reason to believe that he has changed his views now. The only two people I have met in three weeks who profess to believe that Karimov really intends to introduce genuine market reforms are the US Ambassador and the MFA press spokesman. I do not see how, with even the slightest scrap of integrity, the IMF can approve this so-called reform programme. I have worked on economic affairs in post-communist transition economies and in developing countries. This country is not in transition and is not developing.
14. I have asked the views of my diplomatic colleagues as I paid my courtesy calls. Let me be very plain about this next point. I have been told separately by the World Bank and EBRD resident representatives, and by the French, German, Italian, Slovak, Czech, Polish, Indian, Pakistani and Russian Ambassadors that a political deal has been reached in Washington, post September 11, that in return for American use of Uzbek air facilities the IMF would approve the Uzbek economic programme (after pulling out in disgust two years ago). The World Bank rep and the Russian Ambassador (both angrily), plus the French, Italian, and Pakistani Ambassadors (cynically) and the German and Czech Ambassadors (sadly) made explicit their view that this meant approval would be given whether the Uzbeks deserved it or not.

COMMENT

15. The German Ambassador pointed to a painting on his wall named "Illusion". He said that if you went to the theatre to see an illusionist you all enjoyed the spectacle of seeing a man walk on air. You knew it was really impossible, but to remove the curtain would spoil the show. When the IMF came we would all be at the theatre marvelling at the reforms and agree not to look behind the curtain.
16. Which is a good analogy but a stupid idea. This is not an entertainment but affects real lives – especially the poor of Uzbekistan, who have African levels of poverty in this terribly unequal and appallingly governed society. Without real economic reform soon poverty will worsen still further. And that will breed more Islamic fundamentalism (see MIFT). You do not encourage real reform by
 - applauding fake reform. The poor of Uzbekistan should not become more victims of September 11.

17. The integrity of the IMF (although we all doubt it sometimes) should not be sacrificed. Its purpose must be to promote development, not be a tool of regional politics. The diplomatic world of Tashkent is a hothouse, and while the diplomatic corps here may have convinced themselves that there is an understanding that the IMF will not criticise Uzbekistan, ^{for non-economic reasons} it seems to me inherently unlikely that British ~~ministers are party to such a deal.~~ But I do believe that US Ministers may be. The very good BBC Correspondent here, Katherine Davies, has been told by her sources that this was the primary outcome of O'Neill's visit here in June. She asked the question at the O'Neill/Karimov press conference "Will the IMF make a genuine judgement on reform here or will it be content with more sham". Karimov refused to answer the "impertinent" question – in which he was backed by O'Neill.

18. We have no institutional memory of a working visit by a government economist from any department. One would be very welcome.

See MIFT

II

there is an explicit understanding ~~and~~ between Uzbekistan and the US on economic support for Karimov in return for the US bases. This encompasses both the IMF approval and \$ - \$140 million per year of US aid. To justify the US ~~debt~~ (see MIFT)

~~It is not to justify this requires a programme of both economic and human rights reforms~~

Karimov's visit to Washington followed by

I had been in Uzbekistan exactly four weeks when I became convinced that Western policy in Central Asia was completely ill-conceived. This telegram was my first major declaration of my view to London, where it came as a nasty shock

Craig Murray
May 2006.

Confidential
FM Tashkent
TO FCO, Cabinet Office, DFID, MODUK, OSCE Posts, Security Council Posts

16 September 02

SUBJECT: US/Uzbekistan: Promoting Terrorism
SUMMARY

US plays down human rights situation in Uzbekistan. A dangerous policy: increasing repression combined with poverty will promote Islamic terrorism. Support to Karimov regime a bankrupt and cynical policy.

DETAIL

The Economist of 7 September states: "Uzbekistan, in particular, has jailed many thousands of moderate Islamists, an excellent way of converting their families and friends to extremism." The Economist also spoke of "the growing despotism of Mr Karimov" and judged that "the past year has seen a further deterioration of an already grim human rights record". I agree.

Between 7,000 and 10,000 political and religious prisoners are currently detained, many after trials before kangaroo courts with no representation. Terrible torture is commonplace: the EU is currently considering a demarche over the terrible case of two Muslims tortured to death in jail apparently with boiling water. Two leading dissidents, Elena Urlaeva and Larissa Vdovna, were two weeks ago committed to a lunatic asylum, where they are being drugged, for demonstrating on human rights. Opposition political parties remain banned. There is no doubt that September 11 gave the pretext to crack down still harder on dissent under the guise of counter-terrorism.

Yet on 8 September the US State Department certified that Uzbekistan was improving in both human rights and democracy, thus fulfilling a constitutional requirement and allowing the continuing disbursement of \$140 million of US aid to Uzbekistan this year. Human Rights Watch immediately published a commendably sober and balanced rebuttal of the State Department claim.

Again we are back in the area of the US accepting sham reform [a reference to my previous telegram on the economy]. In August media censorship was abolished, and theoretically there are independent media outlets, but in practice there is absolutely no criticism of President Karimov or the central government in any Uzbek media. State Department call this self-censorship: I am not sure that is a fair way to describe an unwillingness to experience the brutal methods of the security services.

Similarly, following US pressure when Karimov visited Washington, a human rights NGO has been permitted to register. This is an advance, but they have little impact given that no media are prepared to cover any of their activities or carry any of their statements. The final improvement State quote is that in one case of murder of a prisoner the police involved have been prosecuted. That is an improvement, but again related to the Karimov visit and does not appear to presage a general change of policy. On the latest cases of torture deaths the Uzbeks have given the OSCE an incredible explanation, given the nature of the injuries, that the victims died in a fight between prisoners.

But allowing a single NGO, a token prosecution of police officers and a fake press freedom cannot possibly outweigh the huge scale of detentions, the torture and the secret executions. President Karimov has admitted to 100 executions a year but human rights groups believe there are more. Added to this, all opposition parties remain banned (the President got a 98% vote) and the Internet is strictly controlled. All Internet providers must go through a single government server and access is barred to many sites including all dissident and opposition sites and much international media (including, ironically, waronterrorism.com). This is in essence still a totalitarian state: there is far less freedom than still prevails, for example, in Mugabe's Zimbabwe. A Movement for Democratic Change or any judicial independence would be impossible here.

Karimov is a dictator who is committed to neither political nor economic reform. The purpose of his regime is not the development of his country but the diversion of economic rent to his oligarchic supporters through government controls. As a senior Uzbek academic told me privately, there is more repression here now than in Brezhnev's time. The US are trying to prop up Karimov economically and to justify this support they need to claim that a process of economic and political reform is underway. That they do so claim is either cynicism or self-delusion.

This policy is doomed to failure. Karimov is driving this resource-rich country towards economic ruin like an Abacha. And the policy of increasing repression aimed indiscriminately at pious Muslims, combined with a deepening poverty, is the most certain way to ensure continuing support for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. They have certainly been decimated and disorganised in Afghanistan, and Karimov's repression may keep the lid on for years – but pressure is building and could ultimately explode.

I quite understand the interest of the US in strategic airbases and why they back Karimov, but I believe US policy is misconceived. In the short term it may help fight terrorism but in the medium term it will promote it, as the Economist points out. And it can never be right to lower our standards on human rights. There is a complex situation in Central Asia and it is wrong to look at it only through a prism picked up on September 12. Worst of all is what appears to be the philosophy underlying the current US view of Uzbekistan: that September 11 divided the World into two camps in the "War against Terrorism" and that Karimov is on "our" side.

If Karimov is on "our" side, then this war cannot be simply between the forces of good and evil. It must be about more complex things, like securing the long-term US military presence in Uzbekistan. I silently wept at the 11 September commemoration here. The right words on New York have all been said. But last week was also another anniversary – the US-led overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile. The subsequent dictatorship killed, dare I say it, rather more people than died on September 11. Should we not remember then also, and learn from that too? I fear that we are heading down the same path of US-sponsored dictatorship here. It is ironic that the beneficiary is perhaps the most unreformed of the World's old communist leaders.

We need to think much more deeply about Central Asia. It is easy to place Uzbekistan in the "too difficult" tray and let the US run with it, but I think they are running in the wrong direction. We should tell them of the dangers we see. Our policy is theoretically one of engagement, but in practice this has not meant much. Engagement makes sense, but it must mean grappling with the problems, not mute collaboration. We need to start actively to state a distinctive position on democracy and human rights, and press for a realistic view to be

taken in the IMF. We should continue to resist pressures to start a bilateral DFID programme, unless channelled non-governmentally, and not restore ECGD cover despite the constant lobbying. We should not invite Karimov to the UK. We should step up our public diplomacy effort, stressing democratic values, including more resources from the British Council. We should increase support to human rights activists, and strive for contact with non-official Islamic groups.

Above all we need to care about the 22 million Uzbek people, suffering from poverty and lack of freedom. They are not just pawns in the new Great Game.

MURRAY

The Head of Eastern Department, Simon Butt, and the Head of the Diplomatic Service, Sir Michael Jay KCMG, were horrified by my questioning of US foreign policy and by my proposal to make a strong speech on human rights in Uzbekistan. This was not Sir Michael Jay's view of diplomacy at all. In fact it is worth noting that, if you replace the word "Diplomacy" with "Duplicity" in Michael Jay's email, it still makes perfect sense.

Craig Murray
May 2006

Simon Butt

From: Michael Jay
Sent: 16 October 2002 17:29
To: Simon Butt
Cc: Menna Rawlings; John Macgregor
Subject: RE: personal

Simon

Thankyou. I think your handling is entirely right. I am all in favour of Ambassadors expressing their views, to us forcefully. But they must use secure channels in doing so. They also need to discriminate between the message & advice to us & the way that message is got across to host governments. That is the basis of good diplomacy. Finally, of course, they need to follow instructions. With any luck we can square these circles with Craig Murray. But let me know if you want me to weigh in myself.

Michael

-----Original Message-----

From: Simon Butt
Sent: 16 October 2002 11:32
To: Michael Jay
Cc: Menna Rawlings; John Macgregor
Subject: RE: personal

Michael,

Frankly, I'm not surprised by this. We are fast developing a problem with Craig Murray, who is using unclassified email pretty indiscriminately to fire off criticisms of the Uzbek regime, US policy etc and (in direct u/c communication with the private office), to question whether Baroness Symons should visit next year. He has also sent the draft text of a speech he is shortly to give at a Freedom House meeting, which criticises the human rights situation in Uzbekistan in terms which are bound to infuriate the Uzbeks ("This country has made very little progress in moving away from the dictatorship of the Soviet period...no effective brake on the authority of a President who has failed to validate his position by facing genuine political opponents in anything resembling a free and fair election").

My proposal to make a strong speech on Uzbek Human Rights at Freedom House was strongly opposed by Sir Michael Jay and Simon Butt. Charles Hill of Eastern Department had the job of negotiating the text with me and, after this pretty sharp correspondence, I largely got the speech I wanted.

Craig Murray
May 2006



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16 October 2002

Craig Murray
HMA Tashkent

2 pages by Airtech

Matthew
Daniel o/r

pa Huma RB

ESP 240/001/02

16/10

Dear Craig

SPEECH TO FREEDOM HOUSE

1. Many thanks for sending a copy of your draft speech. It is hard-hitting, and one that (I think) Martin Luther King would have been proud of. But there are elements of it, as currently drafted, that I doubt should be delivered by an HMA Tashkent. Language which is too outspoken risks antagonising the Uzbek authorities and undermining your mission (in both senses of the word). This applies, for example, to much of paragraph 3, and to points elsewhere (see below).
2. Nowhere in the speech is there any acknowledgement of the Soviet legacy Uzbekistan needs to overcome, or the genuine extremist / terrorist challenges it has had to grapple with in the past: IMU incursions, bombs in Tashkent, Hizb-ut-Tahrir propaganda. We do not accept Uzbek arguments that these problems justify human rights abuses, but we do seek to address them in recognising that.
3. I have also doubts about elements that can broadly be described as involving a judgement or criticism, when the wording for this judgement or criticism is not taken from something that the FCO has said before. An example of this is paragraph 8 beginning "I talk of brutality" As far as I am aware, this language takes you (and therefore the FCO) beyond what we have previously said publicly. As such it should not be used. The best examples of what the FCO is on record as having said are in publications such as the Human Rights Reports. You should already have received a copy of the 2002 Report (HRPD have told me copies were dispatched to Posts two weeks ago), but in case you have not I am (separately) faxing to you copies of three pages on Uzbekistan. As you will see, on torture the Report says "Uzbekistan has a poor record of ensuring respect for



human rights We are concerned about reports of torture....etc etc". We would be content for you to jazz up the language of the Report somewhat, but expressions like "deep shame", "outrage" etc go too far.

4. My doubts also apply to the sentences in the speech beginning "we believe", as the "we" implies the FCO. So for example the sentence "we believe that there are significantly more political and religious prisoners" is one that I have not seen hard evidence to validate. The impression that I have is that things are bad, but not as precise as that. One of the ways 'around' the "we believe" phrase is to refer to reputable sources of information to reinforce these type of judgements by reference to others, eg Amnesty or other Human Rights groups, US State Department Reports etc. It would be much the same as what has been said, but linking the judgements to reputable sources of information - incidentally making them harder to refute.
5. For the reasons outlined in the above paragraphs, I also have doubts about the emotional language used elsewhere in the speech and the soapbox tone of the peroration. It would be better to list these concerns with reference to Uzbekistan's international obligations and then contrast the situation in the country, while combining this with a statement of willingness to engage in dialogue with the authorities, and readiness to offer practical assistance.
6. In general, I would hope that these alterations would have the effect of altering the tone, while pressing the concerns of substance, and making the analysis somewhat more sophisticated. As telno 272 outlines, we have reservations about making too vocal a stance in public. I leave it for you to decide whether you wish us to comment on a revised version, but we would be grateful to see a copy in any event.

Yours ever


Charles Hill
Eastern Department
0207 270 2420

P.S. I agree that the opening remark is great.

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British Embassy
Tashkent

17 October 2002

67 Gulyamova Street
Tashkent
700000
Uzbekistan

Charles Hill
Eastern Department

Tel: 998 71 1207853
Fax: 998 71 1206549
Post E-mail: brit@emb.uz
Website: www.britain.uz

Dr Charles

Thank you for your letter of 16 October and your comments on the proposed speech to Freedom House, which I will rework to take account of your views, subject to the following.

On the question of fact, I am frankly astonished that you claim to have seen no evidence to back my assertion that there are now more political and religious prisoners than there were a year ago. Have you not, for example, seen 3/00/23745-02? You could not have finer evidence. I suggest you look at it instantly. And why do you think I am here? I have spoken to a great many people here, including reputable human rights groups, and representatives of a spectrum of Uzbek and expatriate society. I asked about the August arrests all over the Ferghana Valley. I have met the families of detainees. I know that there are more in political/religious detention now than a year ago.

I can see that you might find this fact politically inconvenient. If you wish me to omit it, then say so. But don't pretend it isn't true.

I will say some more sympathetic things about the problems facing Uzbekistan, but you must appreciate that the government ARE the Soviet legacy. I am not convinced, and nor is anyone else here I have spoken to, that the Tashkent bombs were anything to do with the IMU or Islamic terrorism. There are two prevalent theories – either it was the government attempting to blame the opposition, or internal government faction fighting. To mention the Tashkent bombs as one of the Government's legitimate security concerns would be considered risible by the audience.

Incidentally I would not be at all surprised to see more bombings of this nature in Tashkent shortly, to justify continued repression and try to take off some of the pressure for reform. Do I misremember or were not the Russians known or suspected to use the same tactic of falsely blaming the Chechens for bombs some time back?

On the question of style, of course I agree that the objective of being an Ambassador is to maximise my influence. But you don't gain influence by being a pushover. You don't gain influence by never saying anything interesting, by sticking in the crowd. You gain

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influence by being more informed. Intelligent, articulate and outspoken. You gain influence by being formidable, by being a factor that must be taken into account. You are making what I may call the Chamberlain error. The Uzbek government are not gentlemen. They respect strength. I think they consider us easy to ignore – and I think they have to date been right. You are, incidentally, quite wrong in thinking that an analytical approach makes a more powerful speech.

Consider the evidence. How effective has the softly softly method of influence been? Before my arrival the last two attempts I can see where we tried to influence the government of Uzbekistan were over Hemans' nomination as OSCE rep and over the reinstatement of the BBC Uzbek retransmission service. In both we failed abysmally, with the Uzbeks treating us with a fair deal of contempt. How exactly do our influence methods perform when put to the test? So very well that there is no case for trying another approach?

I find your censures sadly cautious and above all completely unimaginative. Personally I have always regarded the classic public school and Oxbridge influenced FCO house style as ponderous, self-important and ineffective. My style is more direct and, in my view, more effective. I am sorry but I am never going to turn into Polonius. I usually go down very well with business communities, with NGO's (I don't apologise for that) and yes with the host government. Alexander Kwasniewski arrives here next week and I will be most surprised if he doesn't remember me – and President Kuffour of Ghana remains a close friend, a friendship started by a very non-FCO style speech I made on corruption, though in fact not as direct as one subsequently made in the same venue by Clare Short. It takes some getting used to, but I generally end up valued for my honesty.

Uzbekistan is different – the nature of the regime is such that senior individuals have almost never met anyone who dared to disagree with them. They certainly find me a bit of a shock. But I would contend that we have achieved very little in eleven years through the more nuanced approach. It does no harm to actually say what we think.

A speech based on publications is not a good idea. Normally of course we base our lines on what Ministers have said in public, but we have a real problem here because they haven't really said anything – which is something you might usefully seek to remedy. I am sorry you consider the style soap-box. I suspect that lurking behind what you say is a desire that I be so dull that no-one in Uzbekistan notices we have said something on human rights.

Actually I think that outrage is absolutely the correct emotion at learning that someone has been tortured to death with boiling water. If your reaction at seeing photos of this is not to be outraged, but to wonder precisely which UN Convention contains provision against torture by boiling water, then I am sorry. I see the head of ODIHR has called it in public "Horrid". I presume you think he is being a bit strong.

I will try to get a revised version to you shortly. I particularly would like your comment on the distinctions I make between the simply religious and those that espouse violence,

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and on the calls for action (legalisation of political parties etc.) Could you reply with actual drafting amendments.

Cin
Craig Murray

cc Matthew Donnelly, HRPD
Stuart Horsman, RAD
Mary Keefe, DFID
Ian Bond, UKDEL Vienna

PS I don't know if you have noticed but I have a slight speech defect. I can't really call anything "howwid".

RESTRICTED

After my protests at our obtaining intelligence under torture, I was astonished to be called back to London for a meeting on 8 March 2003 at which I was told that torture intelligence was legal, and that Jack Straw and Sir Richard Dearlove, Head of MI6, had decided that in the "War on Terror" we should, as a matter of policy, obtain intelligence got by torture by foreign intelligence services.

At the meeting it was agreed that Sir Michael Wood, the Foreign Office's chief legal adviser, would put in writing his view that we were committing no offence by obtaining torture intelligence. This minute is that legal assurance.

Craig Murray
May 2006

From: Michael Wood
Legal Adviser

Date: 13 March 2003

cc: PS/PUS
Matthew Kidd, WLD

Linda Duffield

**UZBEKISTAN: INTELLIGENCE POSSIBLY OBTAINED UNDER
TORTURE**

1. Your record of our meeting with HMA Tashkent recorded that Craig had said that his understanding was that it was also an offence under the UN Convention on Torture to receive or possess information under torture. I said that I did not believe that this was the case, but undertook to re-read the Convention.

2. I have done so. There is nothing in the Convention to this effect. The nearest thing is article 15 which provides:

"Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made."

3. This does not create any offence. I would expect that under UK law any statement established to have been made as a result of torture would not be admissible as evidence.

[signed]

M C Wood
Legal Adviser
Room K.1.172
Tel: 020 7008 3052
Fax: 020 7008 3071

I was horrified when the massive assault on Iraq started. I knew both that Iraq did not really possess WMDs, and that our weapons were much less precise than the news propaganda claimed; tens of thousands of civilians were dying.

Given that we were supporting the dictator Karimov, I thought it was pretty rich to be claiming to attack Hussein because he was a dictator. I was then outraged to see on BBC World TV a speech by George Bush saying we were going to war in Iraq to dismantle Hussein's torture apparatus. I had just been informed that torture material was legitimate in the War on Terror.

I therefore sent the following telegram. This was the only protest from any British Ambassador at our entering on an illegal war, abandoning the UN Security Council, and following blindly George Bush's violent and acquisitive foreign policy.

Craig Murray
May 2006

Confidential
Fm Tashkent
To FCO

18 March 2003

SUBJECT: US FOREIGN POLICY
SUMMARY

1. As seen from Tashkent, US policy is not much focussed on democracy or freedom. It is about oil, gas and hegemony. In Uzbekistan the US pursues those ends through supporting a ruthless dictatorship. We must not close our eyes to uncomfortable truth.

DETAIL

2. Last year the US gave half a billion dollars in aid to Uzbekistan, about a quarter of it military aid. Bush and Powell repeatedly hail Karimov as a friend and ally. Yet this regime has at least seven thousand prisoners of conscience; it is a one party state without freedom of speech, without freedom of media, without freedom of movement, without freedom of assembly, without freedom of religion. It practices, systematically, the most hideous tortures on thousands. Most of the population live in conditions precisely analogous with medieval serfdom.

3. Uzbekistan's geo-strategic position is crucial. It has half the population of the whole of Central Asia. It alone borders all the other states in a region which is important to future Western oil and gas supplies. It is the regional military power. That is why the US is here, and here to stay. Contractors at the US military bases are extending the design life of the buildings from ten to twenty five years.

4. Democracy and human rights are, despite their protestations to the contrary, in practice a long way down the US agenda here. Aid this year will be slightly less, but there is no intention to introduce any meaningful conditionality. Nobody can believe this level of aid – more than US aid to all of West Africa – is related to comparative developmental need as opposed to political support for Karimov. While the US makes token and low-level references to human rights to appease domestic opinion, they view Karimov's vicious regime as a bastion against fundamentalism. He – and they – are in fact creating fundamentalism. When the US gives this much support to a regime that tortures people to death for having a beard or praying five times a day, is it any surprise that Muslims come to hate the West?

5. I was stunned to hear that the US had pressured the EU to withdraw a motion on Human Rights in Uzbekistan which the EU was tabling at the UN Commission for Human Rights in Geneva. I was most unhappy to find that we are helping the US in what I can only call this cover-up. I am saddened when the US constantly quote fake improvements in human rights in Uzbekistan, such as the abolition of censorship and Internet freedom, which quite simply have not happened (I see these are quoted in the draft EBRD strategy for Uzbekistan, again I understand at American urging).

6. From Tashkent it is difficult to agree that we and the US are activated by shared values. Here we have a brutal US sponsored dictatorship reminiscent of Central and South American policy under previous US Republican administrations. I watched George Bush talk today of Iraq and "dismantling the apparatus of terror... removing the torture chambers and the rape

rooms". Yet when it comes to the Karimov regime, systematic torture and rape appear to be treated as peccadilloes, not to affect the relationship and to be downplayed in international fora. Double standards? Yes.

7. I hope that once the present crisis is over we will make plain to the US, at senior level, our serious concern over their policy in Uzbekistan.

MURRAY

Following my telegram on the start of the Iraq war, Simon Butt, Head of Eastern Department, was sent out from London to tell me I was now considered "Unpatriotic". On return he met with Sir Michael Jay (PUS), to discuss how to deal with me. His letter records this conversation.

Apart from the underlying political context, there are two astonishing things about this letter. The first is the libel by a government department of the anti-war Labour MP Andrew Mackinlay, who to the best of my knowledge had never been in a strip club, in Poland or anywhere else.

The second is that he notes that after dinner I went out with a young lady to a jazz club (which I did - it was my secretary Kristina, and we just went for a quick drink). But while he blows that up with much innuendo, he fails to note something much more significant.

While we were having dinner, the grandson of our host, Professor Mirsaidov, a distinguished dissident, had been abducted from outside the house by Uzbek security services. He had been tortured to death and his body dumped back on the family doorstep at 4am. It had been intended as a warning to dissidents and the British Embassy not to meet each other.

Simon Butt was fully aware of these facts when he wrote this letter, but plainly the murder of our host's grandson - which was inconvenient for our important relationship in the War on Terror with Karimov - was much less worth mentioning than my going for a drink to a jazz bar.

Craig Murray
May 2006

PA: CRAIG MURRAY

1) Along this line to see o/r

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You'll recall recent monitoring.
This sets out very clearly
what has to happen and how.
We'll have to see how he
responds.

From: Simon Butt, Eastern
Date: 16 April 2003

cc: PS/PUS

Howard Drake, PC-SMS

2) Sarah - Please
make sure they
go on Indwi:
it's important. In

To: Linda Duffield

Thank you. Good that Simon
Butt paid this visit. Let's ensure
Eastern Department keeps us in the
loop.

Howard Drake
24/4

SUBJECT: CRAIG MURRAY, TASHKENT

AL 28/4

1. I visited Tashkent from March-1 April. I briefed you orally o/r on my discussions with Craig on his performance, and we met with the PUS yesterday. This is to record the position more formally.
2. I emphasised again to Craig the importance we attached to his demonstrating that he was covering the full range of UK interests/Embassy activity in Uzbekistan. Craig took this point, and provided me with a set of personal objectives (attached) based on a suggested outline I had sent him some weeks ago. They will need some tweaking to be brought into line with the new guidance on SMS objective-setting, but I think that in general they are on the right, comprehensive lines. Craig's objectives for the Post also reflect a broad range of priorities, properly cascaded from those of the Directorate.
3. I discussed with Craig his telegram on US policy, sent and widely copied on the eve of hostilities in Iraq, and another example of his accustomed, rather emotional style. (He has since been instructed, with some of our other Ambassadors who have the same predilection, not to copy their reporting quite so widely, following complaints from Gulf Posts).
4. Craig was unapologetic. What he had said needed saying. He had again received congratulatory emails from a number of other Posts which had received the telegram. These were issues about which he felt strongly, and which needed to be aired. His drafting style reflected his feelings. He was not prepared to compromise on principles to further his career. I did not dispute his right to air the issues (I myself met with the US Ambassador and queried whether US policy was too indulgent towards Uzbekistan). But he should cultivate a more measured and less emotional style, and should not seek to give the impression that he was the only person in the FCO with a conscience. I noted also the need to back up his reporting in this area with constructive proposals for projects: it had not gone unnoticed that Tashkent

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had submitted only one project to the HRPF in the last bidding round (successfully) whereas other Posts in the region had submitted considerably more.

5. More generally, Craig conceded that his style is to bid high, and settle for less. For example, he felt that the Post could manage on its local budget allocation, although that is not, I think, the impression he had given RMU. He has expressed "shock and despair" that Estates Group is unable to fund the conversion of the old upstairs Residence to offices this FY, but in practice is acquiescing in the position.
6. I ought perhaps to mention, without further comment, one further aspect of Craig's unconventional style. After a dinner in Samarkand, the rest of the party returned to our hotel. Craig, in the company of our young female LE fixer, went off in search of a jazz club. I have heard from others that he has patronised strip clubs in Warsaw (where he encountered Andrew McKinley MP). But during my visit his general demeanour was perfectly correct, and I picked up no signs whatsoever of familial tension while staying at the Residence. It is not particularly palatable to set these tales down, but they should be recorded somewhere.
7. We are I think agreed that careful management will continue to be required. Craig is likely to continue to speak as he finds. But he accepts the need to broaden his functions beyond being a powerful advocate of respect for human rights (and he has got us to raise our game on this). He has opened up some valuable new lines of reporting through contacts he has made. He handled a trade mission last autumn well. He is currently organising a series of concerts of British music in a number of Uzbek cities. His public criticism of Uzbekistan's human rights record has not, so far, appeared to hamper his access or his capacity to organise worthwhile programmes for visitors. His staff made no complaints, and I detected no signs of discomfort in the presence of diplomatic, NGO, IFI or business contacts.
8. I find I am able to talk to Craig pretty easily, after a shaky start. I shall continue to attempt to combine firmness with fairness.



Simon Butt
Eastern Department
W90
Tel: 020 7008 2417
Fax: 020 7008 2414

With the Iraq war in full swing, I found myself marked down as not sound on the War and Terror and simply "sent to Coventry" by my London management, as I complained in this exchange of emails with Linda Duffield. This proved to be the calm before the storm.

Craig Murray
May 2006

PA : CRAIG MURRAY

Sarah Douse

From: Howard Drake
Sent: 30 May 2003 15:18
To: Sarah Douse
Subject: FW: Personal for Linda Duffield - Tashkent - communication

S

Important; please make sure it goes on the Craig Murray indiv

H

-----Original Message-----

From: Colin Reynolds
Sent: 29 May 2003 18:23
To: Alan Charlton
Cc: Howard Drake
Subject: FW: Personal for Linda Duffield - Tashkent - communication

To be aware...

Colin

-----Original Message-----

From: Craig Murray
Sent: 28 May 2003 14:14
To: Gillian Angrave
Cc: Colin Reynolds
Subject: Personal for Linda Duffield - Tashkent - communication

Linda

You will recall last autumn I had a spat with Simon and Eastern Dept over what seemed to me a lack of dialogue. Recently staff issues of which I expect you are aware have made Tashkent a still more difficult place than normal, while policy tensions if anything seem to sharpen (I thought the Guardian article of 26 May was excellent on the issues). But again I rather feel sent to Coventry. I send or copy emails every day to Eastern Dept, but the last email, or communication of any kind, I received from anyone in Eastern Dept was on 15 May - and that was a rather terse e-mail confined to the staff issue.

In my last Post - Accra - we exchanged emails with AD(E) many times a day as part of a regular, real-time dialogue both on issues and on day to day management. Before that as Deputy Head of AD(E) I had such a dialogue with all my Posts. Personnel Command have recently been in dialogue with me the same way. I exchange regular views with Research Analysts. The days and weeks of frigid silence from Eastern Dept are simply not the norm in the modern FCO - they are weird and unnerving.

It is already very difficult to work in the repressive Uzbek political environment. The feeling of isolation and lack of support makes it much worse. Colin Reynolds, to whom I have copied this, is coming out on a pastoral visit from PMU at the end of June. I will say more by classified means idc. But I fear policy differences (in which I believe there is plenty of evidence Ministers support my line and actions; I have seen no evidence that Ministers do not) are spilling over into personal behaviour and line management.

Craig

Melanie Weild

From: Gillian Angrave
Sent: 02 June 2003 15:32
To: Melanie Weild
Subject: FW: PERSONAL: COMMUNICATION
Importance: High

PA

Craig Murray
Indiv.

-----Original Message-----

From: Gillian Angrave
Sent: 02 June 2003 15:31
To: Craig Murray
Cc: Colin Reynolds
Subject: PERSONAL: COMMUNICATION
Importance: High

CM
3/6

PERSONAL

Dear Craig

COMMUNICATION

I have just returned to the office today, having been away for the last 10 days in Armenia and Croatia, and have just seen your email about communications with Eastern Department.

You have had a very difficult situation to handle in recent weeks on the staffing front, coping with the increased volume of work and re-building staff morale. All this in a tough and isolated post. Credit to you for soldiering on and doing so generously and in good heart. None of this is easy to handle. I understand that at this time perhaps more than at others you need and expect a little more instant communication with the Department on a range of issues. I am sorry if you feel let down. This is not deliberate, nor do I believe it indicates a lack of pastoral support or personal animosity. It is simply that for both the Head of Department and Head of Section the pressures of work in London have grown exponentially. And with a large number of countries to cover (including some difficult issues elsewhere in the region), they cannot give you instant responses to every email. I am a fan of IT. It has made all our lives simpler, and communications are instant. But human beings in London as well as in Tashkent are suffering from overload. On policy issues, also, security considerations constrain what can be said over unclassified mail.

However, I have mentioned to Simon and Charles your desire to have a bit more in the way of communication. I suggest that you now discuss with them what, more specifically, would be helpful to you, bearing in mind constraints imposed by absences and coping with other priorities elsewhere.

I would, as you know, like to visit Tashkent myself. It will probably not be before the autumn and I will be in touch with you separately about timing. In the meanwhile, please feel free to email me or call me if you need to (via Gill if I am away).

Thanks for keeping the show on the road. Keep smiling.

Yours

Linda

We lost our political officer when he cracked up under the pressure and started attacking people in the street. His partner, my deputy, also left. That was all of my British political and economic resource gone.

Personnel Department sent out an officer, Colin Reynolds, ostensibly on a pastoral visit following these events. In fact he had been primed by the Foreign Office to look for excuses to remove me, and briefed on rumours originated by the US Embassy that I was an alcoholic and kept a "Love-nest" in Tashkent - both completely untrue.

In fact Reynolds' report was very fair. His comments that some procedures were not followed correctly were accurate - he does not note my response, that the tiny staff of our Embassy in Tashkent was not equipped to carry out the full FCO bureaucratic requirements.

Craig Murray
May 2006

RESTRICTED STAFF

From: Colin Reynolds, PMU1
Date: 26 June 2003

cc: Linda Duffield
Simon Butt, Eastern Dept
Simon Pease
Howard Drake
Rufus Legg
Jon Hews, Head, Internal Audit
Harvey Bowyer, FCU

To: Alan Charlton

SUBJECT: MY VISIT TO TASHKENT

1. I visited Tashkent on 19-20 June. There were two main purposes: to follow up on the removal from Post of Chris Hirst (Third Sec Pol) and Karen Moran (C5 DHM and Chris' partner); and to discuss with the Ambassador the reports we were receiving in London about his activities outside of the office.

Chris Hirst and Karen Moran

2. I had meetings with all embassy staff, both collectively and individually. It is clear that the post has gone through an extremely difficult time. Chris Hirst's behaviour both inside the office and out has impacted all staff. The LE staff were afraid of Chris. Matters were made much worse by Karen Moran's behaviour. Not only was she trying to cover Chris' tracks, but it would seem that her management style left a lot to be desired. I heard several accounts, and saw minutes myself on files, which showed that she sacked staff without following proper procedures, and more than once docked an LE member of staff's salary for minor misdemeanours (e.g turning up late). This left LE staff both afraid of Chris Hirst, and afraid to say anything to their DHM for fear that they would lose their jobs.

3. The other UK-based staff (Steve Brown, acting B3, MO); and Angela Clarke (A2 PA/Registry/ECO) also had difficult relations with Chris and Karen (though they both only arrived at post in March this year). Angela's arrival at post was unpleasant. Karen was unreasonable on accommodation arrangements, and did little to help Angela settle into post.

LE Staff

4. In my meeting with LE staff, we went over the ground on Chris Hirst and Karen Moran. I tried to reassure them that we were unable to move as quickly as we would like due to employment law angles in London. We very much regretted that they had been put in this awful situation and were grateful for their perseverance and professionalism throughout. While I have no evidence, I suspect that it was the LE staff who provided the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the information they needed to enable them to call Craig Murray in and ask for Chris Hirst's removal (no one else would have had the detail they needed). I would also be surprised if they were not behind the recent article which appeared locally on the subject.

5. The LE staff are divided into two distinct factions. The long-standing LEI's are on one side, with the fairly new team of LE IIIs on the other. They have recently established an LE Staff Association, which is a good thing. I had a wide ranging discussion with them, touching on salaries (too low), health care (when are we going to hear what you're offering us?), local amenities (an embassy club would be nice), procedures for recruitment (concerns that a proper, transparent procedure was not being followed), dismissal (whenever it suited the DHM, rather than through proper procedures), and the Embassy's reputation outside (see below).

Relations between the UK-based staff and LE staff

6. There is much work to do. Relationships have broken down to a severe extent following Chris Hirst and Karen Moran. There is much suspicion among LE staff. Craig will have to quickly re-establish the trust of the staff. I have spoken to Craig about reports I picked up about the relationship between the Management Officer, Steve Brown, and his LE AMO. They have become friendly outside of the office. The latter is not much liked by the rest of the LE staff. I was told that he was using the official vehicles for private use at the weekends and in the evenings, that he was a bully, and that he used his friendship with Steve to inappropriately influence the other staff. I discussed all this with Steve and with Craig. Both were aware of the problem, and undertook to tackle it quickly.

7. Angela Clarke seems to be doing some good work in trying to mend fences with the LE staff. She takes her job seriously, perhaps a little too seriously, and seems to be settling into post following a very difficult time with Karen Moran on her arrival. She will, however, need to be careful about getting too close to the LE staff outside of the office.

Embassy procedures

8. I was surprised to see that very few standard procedures seem to be in place in the Mission. Not all LE staff have contracts, hardly any have job descriptions or objectives, and none seemed aware of the disciplinary procedures. I have asked Craig and Steve to tackle this as a matter of some urgency. There also seemed to be precious few meetings. This means that the UK-based and LE staffs have little idea of what is going on other than on their own desks. I encouraged Craig to introduce a regular pattern of meetings to discuss objectives, key tasks for the week etc.

9. Lack of rigorous financial controls is also a concern. When I was there one of the drivers was sacked for changing official money on the black market, and obtaining a forged receipt to cover his tracks. The arrangements for negotiating and then paying for staff accommodation also seem less tight than they should. Internal Audit (or the Financial Compliance Unit?) will wish to look very carefully at all the financial controls when they visit in July.

Craig Murray

10. I looked carefully at Craig Murray's handling of the Hirst/Moran situation. While matters were certainly made more difficult by the fact that Karen was covering Chris' tracks, it is still surprising that Craig was unaware of the extent of the damage that Chris and Karen were doing to the Embassy. He should have gripped the situation sooner, listening to the advice he was given in London last November. Craig acknowledges this. He expressed his surprise and disappointment that the LE staff had been unable to go to him direct (I too am surprised by this; the LE staff were uniformly positive about Craig during my visit).

11. In light of the recent article, and of other reports we have received from elsewhere on Craig's behaviour outside of the Mission, I dug fairly deeply in this area. While some of the staff commented that they were initially surprised by Craig's more relaxed style, none said anything about any activities outside the office which would cause us embarrassment. All the staff said they felt Craig's profile was high, and that while his style was undoubtedly unlike any Ambassador they had had before, they all said how much they enjoyed working for him and how much British businesses respected and liked him. They commented that the QBP was by far the best attended in Tashkent (1000 guests attended, including the President's daughter).

12. I was completely open with Craig in all of this. While he didn't hide the fact that he enjoys a drink and enjoys going out with the local British business community at the weekend, he vigorously denied that the article was true. While he was 'no saint', he was doing nothing which could cause any embarrassment. He denied that he had any share in a

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property in Tashkent for which he and others use for "entertainment purposes" (a report which had come to us by a rather circuitous route).

Relations between the Embassy and Eastern Department

13. Relations are clearly strained. Craig complained bitterly that he was kept out of the loop, received very little communication, and that he and the Department had major differences on policy (in particular on Human Rights). He mentioned that only last week one of our Ministers had a conversation with the Uzbek Foreign Minister. Craig only heard about the telephone conversation 3 days after the event, and in the meantime had been put in an embarrassing situation when he had a meeting with the Deputy Foreign Minister (who clearly knew about the conversation and Craig did not). He commented that FCO and other Whitehall Ministers seemed to be pleased with the work he was doing, yet the Directorate were not. I know that Simon Butt is well aware of the problems, and that Linda is too. I recommend that the Department take advantage of his next visit to the UK to try and thrash any policy differences out. It is not good for others in the post to feel that their Ambassador is constantly in battle with the Department.

The way ahead

14. In the short-term I recommend that both PM (you and Howard?) and Eastern Department (Linda and Simon?) take advantage of Craig's next visit to the UK to a) speak to him at a higher level about the recent events in his post and b) for any policy differences to be resolved. Internal Audit (or FCU) will visit Tashkent in July, and MCS will review them in September. These visits are timely. After we have their reports, we will have a clearer picture of what needs to happen next.

15. Carl Garn, the new C5 DHM, and Daniel Grzenda, the new Third Sec Political, will be in post by the beginning of September. In Carl Garn we get a DHM with experience and good political skills. I will brief him fully before his departure. I very much hope that Carl will bring with him the stability and responsibility that has been lacking. He has a big job to do in getting the post back on track and getting the most basic of procedures in place. Daniel is a young officer on his first overseas posting. But he has done well so far, and will bring with him some relevant experience from his last job. He has visited post already and went down well, so he too should be a welcome addition.

[Signed: Colin Reynolds]

Colin Reynolds

PMU1

OAB 2/96

I was delighted to get away on holiday to Canada with my family after an exhausting and difficult year. The personnel officer, Colin Reynolds having failed to bring back the answer they wanted, while I was on leave the FCO sent a political officer, Dominic Schroeder, to Tashkent. The excuse was a "Crisis" they had themselves produced by suspending my five most senior members of office staff.

Schroeder came back and dutifully reported he had found allegations of mismanagement, alcoholism, financial corruption and offering sex in exchange from visas.

I was summoned back immediately from holiday and arrived back to meet Howard Drake of Personnel Department. I went straight from the airport to his office after a 16 hour overnight flight from Vancouver via Chicago, having not slept for 60 hours. As I walked in the door I had no idea I was about to face a huge raft of false allegations and be asked to resign.

In the circumstances I am amazed by how well I managed to defend myself at this meeting! You should bear in mind that this is Howard Drake's record of this meeting; it therefore puts the best possible gloss on what the FCO was doing.

Craig Murray
May 2006

RESTRICTED - STAFF

From: Howard Drake, PD-SMS

Date: 27 August 2003

cc: PS/PUS
Peter Collecott o/r, DG Corporate Affairs
Alan Charlton o/r, Director Personnel
Linda Duffield o/r, Director Wider Europe
Simon Butt o/r, Hd/Eastern Dept
✓ Dominic Schroeder, Eastern Dept
✓ Simon Pease, PD-PM
Tessa Redmayne, PD-PP
✓ Mike Balmer, SSU
✓ Craig Murray, HMA Tashkent

CRAIG MURRAY, HMA TASHKENT

1. At my request, Mr Murray came to see me on 21 August prior to his return to Tashkent following a leave absence. The meeting was also attended by Tessa Redmayne of PD-PP and Kate Smith representing the DSA.
2. I explained both Personnel and Wider Europe Directorates were now of the view that he should withdraw from post on operational grounds. We had very serious concerns about the way the post was being run under his leadership. There were also a number of very serious allegations which had been made about Mr Murray's personal conduct. We were bound to investigate these allegations (as yet unproven). Some of them also raised concerns on security grounds, which SSU would be exploring given that Mr Murray's DV was coming up for review in any case.
3. I handed Mr Murray copies of the reports (copies attached) by Colin Reynolds and Dominic Schroeder following their separate recent visits to Tashkent. I recognised that Mr Murray had seen neither of these before (the Schroeder visit took place after Mr Murray had departed on leave, but the contents of the Reynolds' report had been discussed in full with him) and so invited him to take them away and consider them.
4. The operational factors which strongly argued for his withdrawal were as follows:
 - (a) Mr Murray's handling of the Hirst/Moran cases showed a clear failure to meet the standard of management required of a senior member of the Diplomatic Service. It also demonstrated a failure to exercise a proper duty of care for other staff at post in view of the acts of violence which had taken place. In particular, Mr Murray had not responded adequately to a request by the Uzbek Foreign Minister that the Embassy do something about the behaviour of Chris Hirst. Advice from London on handling the issue appeared not to have been followed.
 - (b) There had been a substantial breakdown in the relationship between UK-based and LE staff at post, which Mr Murray had failed to address. We understood that respect had

broken down following the handling of the Hirst/Moran affair, such that the LE staff wrote to the Director General Corporate Affairs asking for action to be taken. There had been completely inadequate support for the efforts of Steve Brown and Angela Clark, junior officers in the post, to grapple with the situation.

- (c) As noted in Colin Reynolds' report, there appeared to be an absence of standard management procedures at post. There were also indications of inadequate financial controls in place. The Post Account was not submitted on time eg the May one had not yet arrived.
 - (d) Wider Europe Directorate also felt that Mr Murray's managerial performance, taken alongside elements of his conduct and security concerns, argued for his leaving post.
5. In addition to these major operational concerns, Dominic Schroeder had reported a series of very serious allegations from members of the UK-based staff in Tashkent. The FCO was duty bound to look into them, and determine if there were a disciplinary case to answer. Some of the allegations related to potential vulnerabilities from a security point of view, and SSU had been concerned given the very explicit warnings given to Mr Murray prior to taking up post on his conduct.
6. I said that Mr Murray should be in no doubt that this was a very serious matter. We were asking Mr Murray to agree to withdraw from post as soon as possible ie returning to Tashkent to pack up and leave during September. We were also very mindful of Mr Murray's own well-being, and his own consideration of an early departure in discussion with senior management a month or so earlier.
7. I invited Mr Murray to comment, adding that given the circumstances (he had come direct to the meeting after an overnight flight from Canada, and was en route back to Tashkent) he was free to add to anything he might say at our meeting when he'd had time to consider the details more carefully.
8. Mr Murray made the following points:
- (a) Mr Murray explained that he was shocked and would try not to be emotional. If the Office wanted to suspend him while the disciplinary issues were investigated, fine. But he was not going to leave post on the grounds I had outlined.
 - (b) The allegations reported in the Schroeder note were wrong and largely untrue. For example, he had never had any say in LE staffing in Visa Section or salary levels. He did not tell anyone not to co-operate with Colin Reynolds ahead of his recent visit. Overall, the allegations were a load of malicious gossip or a malicious twisting of the facts (for example, it was true the May account had not been signed off, but this was because of the many other preoccupations in the aftermath of the Chris Hirst withdrawal). The band was regularly used by the British Council, and its visit was paid for under the Directorate programme budget. Overall, Mr Murray did not believe that the majority of allegations were backed by four UK-based staff as claimed. He believed they were 80% the views of Angela Clark.
 - (c) Mr Murray acknowledged that he had an unconventional lifestyle: he liked parties, going to bars and having fun. This did not make him a bad Ambassador. Mr Murray quoted from the Colin Reynolds' report on how his staff enjoy working for him, the respect in

which he is held by the business community, and the very high turnout at the QBP. Indeed, there seemed to be a very clear difference between the sentiments reported in the Reynolds' report and those in the Schroeder report.

- (d) Mr Murray had not initiated any maladministration, and the claim that he was failing on administrative grounds was unfair. Mr Murray pointed out that his management resource constituted 40% of a B3 officer. With all his other preoccupations, it was not surprising that Mr Murray had not been able to improve deficient procedures that he had inherited. He recognised that Angela Clark and Steve Brown would have liked more support. But this was against a backdrop of having just lost a DHM and another member of staff. He also felt that Angela and Steve had a problem with the LE staff, for which he could not be held responsible.
- (e) Mr Murray absolutely denied any maladministration on handling of the Hirst case. He asked me to look at the letter he had written to Simon Butt on his handling of the issue. 90% of the attacks by Hirst on members of the public had happened before Mr Murray arrived. Mr Murray said his predecessor had been called in by the Uzbeks about Hirst's behaviour, but nothing had been done about it. Mr Murray felt that at that stage Personnel Directorate had supported Chris Hirst. Mr Murray had requested a meeting with Personnel Directorate in January 2003 because he felt that there were real problems with Hirst, and that he did not believe Hirst anymore. It was on that occasion that Mr Murray learnt for the first time that there was a history of violence on Hirst's part: Mr Murray should have been told that at the outset. Eastern Department were also aware of that history, but they too had not told Mr Murray. None of the violent incidents towards the LE staff had taken place while Mr Murray had been in post. Mr Murray confirmed, in response to my question, that the advice he was given at the January 2003 meeting was that moving Hirst to another house was the approach to follow. He had followed that advice. Simon Butt had visited at the end of March, when they agreed that a written warning should be given to Hirst about his behaviour towards LE staff. Mr Murray sought advice from PP on that written warning. Mr Murray told Hirst that such a warning was imminent, to which Hirst's response had been that he would resign. Mr Murray had told Hirst that would be an over-reaction. Mr Murray acknowledged that there was a two-week delay before giving the written warning: this was because of the pressure of work for which he needed Hirst and Moran eg the QBP in late April, the AGM of the EBRD held in Tashkent under UK Chairmanship, a visit by Clare Short, and a British cultural festival. The warning in the event was overtaken by the Foreign Minister calling Mr Murray in around 5 May seeking Hirst's removal. All the while Karen Moran had been destroying MFA notes about Hirst's violence, and so Mr Murray was not in the picture. Overall, Mr Murray did not honestly think he had mishandled the situation. He had followed London advice, and he could not be faulted if his DHM was not telling him what was going on. Mr Murray was mystified why the LE staff, who like him, did not come to him to talk about the Moran/Hirst issues.
- (f) Mr Murray said the FCO had every right to investigate the misconduct allegations. But Mr Murray was not prepared to withdraw on spurious administrative grounds. It was true that prior to his leave Mr Murray had wondered whether he really wanted to go on. After four weeks away he was convinced he did. It would not be fair to judge Mr Murray on the basis of the circumstances he had had to confront in his first year. Mr Murray had

not been given a fair crack of the whip or a chance to show how he could run a post with a half-decent staff. It would be a terrible injustice to pull him out.

- (g) Mr Murray said that the move to get him was being conducted by Eastern Department. Personnel Directorate needed to consider whether policy disagreements were leading to a bias against Mr Murray. Mr Murray acknowledged that he was not the usual FCO personality, and that he asked difficult policy questions (by way of illustration, he described in outline a highly classified telegram concerning intelligence obtained via torture). Mr Murray firmly believed that policy differences were at the root of all this: he had clearly got up the noses of senior management. Eastern Department would sling any mud they could at Mr Murray. The claim on the overspend on the DHM house was a very good example. He had been given an allocation from London for that and it was true it was overspent. But the contract had been drawn up in London, and the scope of the work to be done had been drawn up in London. The vouchers did not come through the post, so Mr Murray didn't know of the overspend until afterwards. This had been investigated. Unless one were malicious, one could not lay that at Mr Murray's door. It was a completely unfair accusation.
- (h) Mr Murray repeated that he was not going to agree to leave the post on operational grounds, only for us then to pursue the disciplinary complaints and throw him out of the Office. It would be newsworthy to take disciplinary action while he was serving as an Ambassador. If he was in London, it would be less so. Mr Murray repeated that he had not had a fair chance. He had had very bad staff up to now. He was very happy for some of these very serious allegations to be investigated, and he would co-operate fully. But the administrative case for withdrawal was nonsense. Only a month earlier, Linda Duffield had told him of her support for him staying on if that was what his decision was to be. So how did the Schroeder visit change everything?

9. I told Mr Murray, in response to his direct question, that his response did not change our view that his withdrawal from post was the right thing. I saw no point in our arguing back and forth the specifics at this meeting: he would have time to do that. But he should know that his account in several areas was different from our understanding. Mr Murray asked why I was not instructing him to leave as opposed to asking him or suspending him while the disciplinary investigations were pursued. I reiterated that our hope was that he and we would agree that his withdrawal would be the right step. We also had in mind his well-being and dignity. Withdrawal in itself was not a disciplinary penalty. At the same time, he needed to know that in any case we would have to investigate the misconduct allegations which had come to light and SSU would be looking carefully at these allegations in considering his DV status. I said that I had noted Mr Murray's statement that he would not withdraw on what he called spurious administrative grounds. I asked him to go away and think the matter through more carefully, and asked that he let us know his decision by Thursday 28 August at the latest. In view of others' and my leave absences at that time, he should convey his response to Dominic Schroeder as acting Head of Eastern Department, and copy it to Tessa Redmayne. Once we knew what he had decided to do, we would consider next steps.

10. Mr Murray took note. He asked whether, were he to withdraw, the FCO would be able to help in connection with housing costs (his UK property is let to tenants) and school for his children. I said that we would be prepared to consider that sympathetically. I also pointed

out that we would not seek to impose any financial penalty for what would effectively be a short tour (eg he would get the full paid baggage allowance etc as if he were completing a full tour).

11. Tessa Redmayne outlined the process which would be followed for the misconduct investigation. The FCO's Misconduct Procedure (set out in FCO Guidance Volume 1, Chapter 21) would be followed. At this stage, the facts needed to be established to decide whether there was a disciplinary case to answer. The staff who had raised the allegations would be asked to substantiate them with a full written statement. Mr Murray would be asked similarly for his account. The report would conclude whether there was a case of misconduct for Mr Murray to answer, and if so, the level of seriousness involved. Normally this initial fact-finding exercise would be carried out by the line manager. Mr Murray felt that it should not be any of his immediate line managers because of their potential to be prejudiced against him because of disagreements at a policy level. Tessa undertook to reflect on this and see if a different colleague might take this on. In the meantime, the staff concerned would be alerted to the fact that Mr Murray had been told of the allegations in general terms. He should not discuss any of this with them or take any action which might be seen as putting pressure on them, and they would be instructed to report any such pressure. It was in everyone's interest to move things forward quickly so Mr Murray could expect to hear soon who had been appointed and how they would be proceeding.

12. I should record my recognition that this was a very difficult discussion for Mr Murray, and that he conducted himself entirely properly throughout. Tessa Redmayne and I reminded him of the help available on a confidential basis from the Welfare staff to talk the issues through. In recognition of the circumstances, I have agreed the content of this note with Mr Murray and this represents our agreed view of our conversation.

Howard Drake
Assistant Director
PD-SMS

Tel: 7008-1352
Fax: 7008-0788

The British community in Tashkent were astonished to find their Ambassador was under attack.

Craig Murray
May 2006

Residents and Businesspersons,
Tashkent,
Uzbekistan

H.M. PRINCIPAL SECRETARY OF STATE,
THE FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
C/O DEPUTY AMBASSADOR CARL GARN,
THE BRITISH EMBASSY,
TASHKENT

16 September 2003

SIR,

Mr. Craig Murray,
H.M. Ambassador to Uzbekistan

- 1) We, the under-named, represent a substantial proportion of the small British and International population of Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
- 2) We believe that H.M. Ambassador, Mr. Craig Murray, is under your suspicion for alleged misconduct or mismanagement in his incumbency. Since we are not privy to events within the confines of the Embassy, we are unaware of the grounds upon which any such allegations may be based, but we are fully acquainted with the public performance of Mr. Murray in the execution of his duties.
- 3) Ever since his arrival here in Uzbekistan, Mr. Murray has taken a keen and active interest in British business concerns here, and in Aid activities funded by the British Government.
- 4) He has promoted, British culture and political ideals to an extent not previously known here, and has increased British prestige by his promotions, and by his forthright expression of British ideals, significantly in the issue of Human Rights.
- 5) Since we are unaware of the nature of any charges against Mr. Murray, we are unable to comment upon them, but we believe him to be a man of integrity and dedication, and are confident that any such charges will prove to be groundless.
- 6) We are prepared to meet jointly with the officer(s) of the investigation, which we believe you have initiated into Mr. Murray's activities, and to answer questions as to his conduct, his effectiveness in Post, and the esteem in which he is held. We believe that any investigation into Mr. Murray's activities would be unsound if it were not to consider such generally-held views.
- 7) We of the undernamed who are British Citizens are proud of our Ambassador and of his achievements in promoting British ideals and interests in Uzbekistan. We are also encouraged by his tireless work in improving the efficiency, effectiveness and prestige of the Embassy.

8) We have every confidence in Mr. Murray, and trust that your investigation will have the just outcome of allowing him to continue his incumbency as H.M. Ambassador to Uzbekistan, and, when his term here is over, to pursue his further career in your Office with his customary zeal, intelligence, dedication and effectiveness.

9) Please note the following in respect of the subscribers:

- a) We do not claim to represent all of the body of opinion in Uzbekistan (or even in Tashkent). The subscribers are random responses to an invitation for support for our Ambassador, which was sent-out on a routine mailing-list from which were pruned local nationals and Embassy staff. The list is neither exhaustive nor selective.
- b) Some others have voiced support for the Ambassador and have confirmed that they have previously written to you in this respect, and have nothing further to add to their previous correspondence.
- c) Even more have voiced support, but have regretted that their company policy does not permit their involvement in matters, which may be political.

We remain,
Sir,
Yours faithfully,

- Ray Brown; Director, Eurocommerce Ltd, (British National)
- Pedro Burkai; The Consul of Spain (Spanish)
- Kevin Edmonds; Managing Director, Hermes Datacoms Int (British)
- Steve Elliot; Project Manager, Baker Hughes (British)
- Phil Hesketh; Country Director, Wakefield Inspection Services (British)
- Robert Horton; General Director, JV Uz-Texaco (American)
- Rene Ijsselstein; Managing Director Central Asia, British and American Tobacco (Dutch)
- James McGrory; General Director, 3C-Uzbekistan/CCC Ltd, (British)
- Jitendra Patel; Director, Quickstop Holdings Ltd, (British)
- Eric Reynolds; Independent Consultant (British)
- Ali Saleh; Director, Eurocommerce Ltd (British)
- Igor Sidelnikov; Managing Attorney, Denton Wilde Sapte and Mouborak Kambarova, Uzbekistan, (Belarus)
- Sudhir Sreenivasan; Financial Controller, Quickstop Holdings Ltd, (Indian)
- Philip Vigors, Country Manager, Case New Holland, (British)
- Richard Wilkins; Director, Oxus Gold PLC (British).

It became plain to me that I had no hope of a fair investigation of the allegations against me. In particular I would not be allowed to call defence witnesses; indeed I was not allowed to tell anyone of the existence of the allegations. I was also banned from entering my own Embassy, and confined to my house in Tashkent.

It became too much for me, and I sent this email back from Tashkent to my union representative, Kate Smith, just before leaving to go into psychiatric care for depression. I am surprised by how articulate and clear-minded my email was.

Craig Murray
May 2006

Craig Murray Tashkent - CONF

From: Craig Murray Tashkent - CONF [/o=HMG
FCO/ou=MAILBOXC/cn=Recipients/cn=Cmurray]
To: Kate Smith
Subject: FW: PERSONAL - from Diane Corner

Kate

Sadly I can't take much more of this. When I described it to you as "unremitting hostility" from the Administration that was, I feel, putting it over-mildly. I am returning to St Thomas' for psychiatric treatment, because I am judged suicidal (I must admit I did consider it very seriously, but happily decided against).

My own view is that by bullying me into mental illness, not least by entirely spurious resignation deadlines and DV reviews (and a continued stream of false allegations of pressure made by the same people who brought the original allegations), the office has already done something to me which must be actionable.

I want most strongly to question the procedure. I am not allowed to make known the allegations to those, not least LE staff in the Embassy, who would come forward to defend me if they knew. Nor am I allowed to approach potential defence witnesses. It seems to try to arrange any kind of defence against being sacked is in itself a disciplinary offence for which I can be sacked. I am now allowed to let the Administration have a list of "defence" witnesses whom I would like Tony Crombie to interview, and they themselves will decide which of my defence witnesses should be allowed. Those witnesses allowed will then be interviewed without being told what the allegation is about which they are being interviewed, which will hardly help them volunteer the correct and relevant information. This is Kafkaesque in the extreme. I do not see how the DSA or the FDA can allow this to proceed. Frankly if it can't protect a long-standing member from this sort of persecution, I don't see the point of the organisation.

Can you come see me in St Thomas on Tuesday? Diane Nelson in MWD should have contact details.

Craig

-----Original Message-----

From: Tessa Redmayne
Sent: 03 September 2003 16:26
To: Craig Murray Tashkent - CONF
Subject: PERSONAL - from Diane Corner

Craig

Diane Corner asked me to send this to you in her absence this morning



Corner to murray
030903_.doc

Tessa Redmayne

I received many documents through an application under the Data Protection Act. These have been edited by the Foreign Office, with areas blacked out in the "interests of national security".

This is an interesting example. This minute of 26 September 2003 is addressed to Sir Michael Jay (PS/PUS) and Jack Straw (PS). By convention minutes are addressed to the Private Secretary (PS) not the Secretary of State direct.

Among the things deleted for reasons of national security is who the minute was copied to. The copy addressees would be at the top right hand corner under the date. A friend of mine in Jack Straw's office (remember I worked in the FCO for 21 years) tells me that the copy addressees on this and scores of other documents about me going through Jack Straw's office, included 10 Downing Street, MI6 and the MOD. That is why they have been deleted. As detailed in the book, the instruction to get rid of me had come to the FCO from No 10 on the instigation of the Americans.

Craig Murray
May 2006

Reference: //2003

From: [REDACTED]
Date: 26 September 2003

cc: [REDACTED]

PS/PUS
PS

**CRAIG MURRAY, HMA TASHKENT: LETTER FROM [REDACTED]
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE**

ISSUE

1. [REDACTED] wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 29 August expressing concern at rumours that Craig Murray, HMA Tashkent had been withdrawn for disciplinary reasons.

TIMING

2. Priority.

PREFERRED OPTION

3. That the Foreign Secretary reply along the lines of the attached draft.

RESTRICTED STAFF

AGREED BY

4. Eastern Department, HRPD and Press Office.

BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENT

5. Allegations about the conduct of our Ambassador in Tashkent, Craig Murray, came to light during visits by Personnel Directorate and Eastern Department to the Post in June and August respectively. Following these visits Craig Murray was asked to call into the Office to see Personnel Directorate during his recent leave. He was accompanied by a representative of the DSA. At the meeting Craig Murray was told of the allegations made against him, and that we would need to investigate. He was asked to consider withdrawing voluntarily from Post in the circumstances. But he refused to do so, arguing that he should remain at post while the investigation was carried out. He was told he should not discuss the allegations made with any member of the staff at the Embassy when he returned to Post.
6. [REDACTED]
7. Craig Murray briefed his staff – and we suspect outside contacts – on his possible withdrawal. A campaign against this started last month:
- a) [REDACTED] contacted the Head of HRPD to allege that policy differences with the FCO over human rights had led to a campaign by the FCO to remove the ambassador;
 - b) [REDACTED]
 - c) A similar number of local businesses, including the local office of British Airways, wrote in his support;
 - d) [REDACTED] telephoned the PUS on 29 August on Craig Murray's behalf, protesting at the FCO's treatment of him.
8. Our investigation into the allegations against Murray was interrupted when he was taken ill a few weeks ago and brought back to the UK for medical treatment. The current prognosis is that he will be unfit for work for several weeks and also unfit to contribute to the disciplinary investigation process, which has therefore been put on hold.

9.

[REDACTED]

We are about to send a temporary SMS level Charge to provide support at a senior level. An undertaking has been given to Craig Murray that his temporary absence from Post due to illness will not be used as a reason to curtail the posting permanently. Medical and Welfare staff are in regular contact with him in hospital.

PARLIAMENT AND MEDIA

[REDACTED]

We also know that Craig Murray has tried to contact Andrew Mackinlay MP. UK Parliamentary interest is therefore quite possible.

Carole Sweeney

Carole Sweeney
Assistant Director Personnel Policy
PC-PP 2/79

Tel: 020 7008 0734

I continued to refuse to resign and in the end was found Not Guilty of all the allegations against me, but given a formal warning for not having kept the allegations secret. Following a parliamentary and media campaign in my favour, I returned as Ambassador to Tashkent.

In July 2004, following the Abu Ghraib revelations, I yet again went back to argue with London that we should not be receiving intelligence from the Uzbek torture chambers. We were, I said, "Selling our souls for dross". This telegram was leaked to the Financial Times, leading the FCO to tell the Uzbek government (before they told me) that I had been withdrawn as British Ambassador to Tashkent

Craig Murray
May 2006

CONFIDENTIAL
FM TASHKENT
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 63
OF 220939 JULY 04

INFO IMMEDIATE DFID, ISLAMIC POSTS, MOD, OSCE POSTS UKDEL EBRD
LONDON, UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS MEW YORK

SUBJECT: RECEIPT OF INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED UNDER TORTURE

SUMMARY

1. We receive intelligence obtained under torture from the Uzbek intelligence services, via the US. We should stop. It is bad information anyway. Tortured dupes are forced to sign up to confessions showing what the Uzbek government wants the US and UK to believe, that they and we are fighting the same war against terror.
2. I gather a recent London interdepartmental meeting considered the question and decided to continue to receive the material. This is morally, legally and practically wrong. It exposes as hypocritical our post Abu Ghraib pronouncements and fatally undermines our moral standing. It obviates my efforts to get the Uzbek government to stop torture they are fully aware our intelligence community laps up the results.
3. We should cease all co-operation with the Uzbek Security Services they are beyond the pale. We indeed need to establish an SIS presence here, but not as in a friendly state.

DETAIL

4. In the period December 2002 to March 2003 I raised several times the issue of intelligence material from the Uzbek security services which was obtained under torture and passed to us via the CIA. I queried the legality, efficacy and morality of the practice.
5. I was summoned to the UK for a meeting on 8 March 2003. Michael Wood gave his legal opinion that it was not illegal to obtain and to use intelligence acquired by torture. He said the only legal limitation on its use was that it could not be used in legal proceedings, under Article 15 of the UN Convention on Torture.
6. On behalf of the intelligence services, Matthew Kydd said that they found some of the material very useful indeed with a direct bearing on the war on terror. Linda Duffield said that she had been asked to assure me that my qualms of conscience were respected and understood.
7. Sir Michael Jay's circular of 26 May stated that there was a reporting obligation on us to report torture by allies (and I have been instructed to refer to Uzbekistan as such in the context of the war on terror). You, Sir, have made a number of striking, and I believe heartfelt, condemnations of torture in the last few weeks. I had in the light of this decided to return to this question and to highlight an apparent contradiction in our policy. I had intimated as much to the Head of Eastern Department.

8. I was therefore somewhat surprised to hear that without informing me of the meeting, or since informing me of the result of the meeting, a meeting was convened in the FCO at the level of Heads of Department and above, precisely to consider the question of the receipt of Uzbek intelligence material obtained under torture. As the office knew, I was in London at the time and perfectly able to attend the meeting. I still have only gleaned that it happened.

9. I understand that the meeting decided to continue to obtain the Uzbek torture material. I understand that the principal argument deployed was that the intelligence material disguises the precise source, ie it does not ordinarily reveal the name of the individual who is tortured. Indeed this is true – the material is marked with a euphemism such as "From detainee debriefing." The argument runs that if the individual is not named, we cannot prove that he was tortured.

10. I will not attempt to hide my utter contempt for such casuistry, nor my shame that I work in an organisation where colleagues would resort to it to justify torture. I have dealt with hundreds of individual cases of political or religious prisoners in Uzbekistan, and I have met with very few where torture, as defined in the UN convention, was not employed. When my then DHM raised the question with the CIA head of station 15 months ago, he readily acknowledged torture was deployed in obtaining intelligence. I do not think there is any doubt as to the fact

11. The torture record of the Uzbek security services could hardly be more widely known. Plainly there are, at the very least, reasonable grounds for believing the material is obtained under torture. There is helpful guidance at Article 3 of the UN Convention; "The competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the state concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights." While this article forbids extradition or deportation to Uzbekistan, it is the right test for the present question also.

12. On the usefulness of the material obtained, this is irrelevant. Article 2 of the Convention, to which we are a party, could not be plainer:

"No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture."

13. Nonetheless, I repeat that this material is useless – we are selling our souls for dross. It is in fact positively harmful. It is designed to give the message the Uzbeks want the West to hear. It exaggerates the role, size, organisation and activity of the IMU and its links with Al Qaida. The aim is to convince the West that the Uzbeks are a vital cog against a common foe, that they should keep the assistance, especially military assistance, coming, and that they should mute the international criticism on human rights and economic reform.

14. I was taken aback when Matthew Kydd said this stuff was valuable. Sixteen months ago it was difficult to argue with SIS in the area of intelligence assessment. But post Butler we know, not only that they can get it wrong on even the most vital and high profile issues, but that they have a particular yen for highly coloured material which exaggerates the threat. That is precisely what the Uzbeks give them. Furthermore MI6 have no operative within a thousand miles of me and certainly no expertise that can come close to my own in making this assessment.

15. At the Khuderbegainov trial I met an old man from Andizhan. Two of his children had

been tortured in front of him until he signed a confession on the family's links with Bin Laden. Tears were streaming down his face. I have no doubt they had as much connection with Bin Laden as I do. This is the standard of the Uzbek intelligence services.

16. I have been considering Michael Wood's legal view, which he kindly gave in writing. I cannot understand why Michael concentrated only on Article 15 of the Convention. This certainly bans the use of material obtained under torture as evidence in proceedings, but it does not state that this is the sole exclusion of the use of such material.

17. The relevant article seems to me Article 4, which talks of complicity in torture. Knowingly to receive its results appears to be at least arguable as complicity. It does not appear that being in a different country to the actual torture would preclude complicity. I talked this over in a hypothetical sense with my old friend Prof Francois Hampson, I believe an acknowledged World authority on the Convention, who said that the complicity argument and the spirit of the Convention would be likely to be winning points. I should be grateful to hear Michael's views on this.

18. It seems to me that there are degrees of complicity and guilt, but being at one or two removes does not make us blameless. There are other factors. Plainly it was a breach of Article 3 of the Convention for the coalition to deport detainees back here from Bagram, but it has been done. That seems plainly complicit.

19. This is a difficult and dangerous part of the World. Dire and increasing poverty and harsh repression are undoubtedly turning young people here towards radical Islam. The Uzbek government are thus creating this threat, and perceived US support for Karimov strengthens anti-Western feeling. SIS ought to establish a presence here, but not as partners of the Uzbek Security Services, whose sheer brutality puts them beyond the pale.

MURRAY